Immigration and Integration in Post-Industrial Societies

Theoretical Analysis and Policy-Related Research

Edited by

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To my parents

who immigrated and integrated

and to my eldest son

who is considering migration and integration

Contents

Acknowledgements

The chapters in this volume are the work of individual authors, but the sum total is the product of extensive collaboration. The project was conceived at the Center for Urban and Regional Studies at the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa, following the public and academic debates regarding the large wave of immigrants from the former USSR to Israel in the early 1990s. International experts were invited to submit their contributions and to discuss them face to face. A group of Israelis and some 30 highly experienced analysts of migration processes from universities in the US, the UK, France, the Netherlands and Australia participated in the project. Most of them came to the workshop in Haifa and enjoyed its pleasant and highly fruitful three days of discussions. Resubmission on the basis of what was learnt in the workshop and a formal process of anonymous peer review followed. The essays that survived all these stages are presented in this collection. I deeply thank the many colleagues who took part in the review process.

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Mt Carmel, Haifa, Israel NAOMI CARMON

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Introduction

Naomi Carmon

What are the carriers of development in the post-industrial world? Many believe that science and technology are the carriers, because they generate the rapid changes experienced by people in the highly developed countries. Scientific discoveries and technological innovations have had an enormous impact on national economy and particularly on the structure of the labor force, but their influence on family and community life and on the political order have been less marked. But what about the future? Can the accelerated rate of technological and economic change continue, without parallel social and political change? The answer to this question seems to depend in large part on migration, which may turn out to be the carrier of development in the next century.

Human history is replete with examples of migration movements that changed the course of history. The widespread invasions and settlement of Goths and Vandals from central Europe and Hun invasions from Central Asia gradually destroyed the Roman empire in the fifth century. Immigration of Norsemen from Scandinavia to the British Isles, France and Russia reshaped the political and social structure of Europe in the eighth and ninth centuries. Much later, European countries became the largest exporters, rather than importers, of migrants. Migration from Europe was especially high between the mid-nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century (c. 1930), the same years which witnessed the worldwide revolutionary process of Westernization (von Laue, 1988).

Among other things, the Europeans spread the concept of the nation-state, which gradually became the leading player on the world stage. In the past half-century, almost all of the world's population has been sorted and organized – not always neatly – according to the principles of territoriality and citizenship which characterize the nation-state (Alonso, 1987). In spite of specific disturbances, it seems that the nation-state has been accepted as a focus of identity in almost all of the developed and many of the developing countries.

Most of the essays in this collection consider the response of developed countries to streams of immigrants, who are frequently thought of as an intolerable burden on the economies of the receiving societies, and are always viewed as a potential threat to the identity and social cohesiveness

of the host nation-states. The essays are briefly presented below. Following the presentation, I shall return to the issue of immigration and the future of nation-states in our world.

The chapters in this book are organized into four parts, the first of which sets the framework by pointing out crucial questions and variables. In the opening chapter, I try to characterize the new post-industrial era by identifying its five megatrends: global orientation, economic restructuring, demographic changes, legitimized diversification of life styles (not only between but also within countries), and a growing disparity between the haves and the have-nots, as evinced by the socioeconomic characteristics of groups of population within each country, as well as by comparisons among countries.

The chapter examines the relationship between the characteristics of the post-industrial era and the number and types of immigrants to the countries that have entered this age. It finds that the current numbers of immigrants in the various countries, at least in Europe, are still quite modest. However, the popularity of anti-immigration policies is increasing in all of the rich countries, in spite of the clear evidence regarding net economic gains to the receiving countries, which increase with time. Because many of the new immigrants are ethnically very different from the majority of the existing populations, because economic benefits are seldom felt (at least in the short run) by the localities that receive most of the immigrants, and especially because the numbers are expected to grow immensely in the coming years, all of the highly developed countries are trying to limit legal immigration sharply and are doing their utmost to prevent the entry of illegal immigrants. It is yet unclear whether they can succeed, at a time when the conditions of improving communication tools and growing disparity between nations continue to exist. If they do not, the chances of highly increased social diversification and major political changes will be very high.

In Chapter 2, Peter Marcuse touches upon the issue of the ideal society and the questions regarding desirable patterns of immigrant integration in a democratic society. He does this by using his extensive observation of social behavior in the urban settings of several countries as a basis for an essay on the different meanings of walls which separate people. Walls of the type he describes can be tangible or intangible, physical, social or economic, official or customary. They draw distinctions between the 'dominating city', the 'gentrified city', the 'suburban city', the 'tenement city' and the 'abandoned city'. New immigrants tend to settle in 'tenement cities', places that are typically occupied by lower-paid, blue and white collar workers, and generally (although not in the US) include

substantial social housing. These places are walled-in socially, if not physically, and defined either as 'enclaves', which are perceived as having positive value, or as 'ghettos', a designation with clearly pejorative connotations. Marcuse suggests that, even though for the blacks in the US the real meaning of spatial segregation has been the formation of ghettos, separation of apparently the same kind has worked differently for most other non-white groups and for most new immigrants; for them, living in separate communities defined by their national origin has resulted in vital mutual support and an orientation toward the new land. Most of the immigrant communities have been voluntary and transitional, and have assisted their members in joining the mainstream. Marcuse's conclusion is that certain kinds of walls between people may be desirable, as long as they separate cultures of equal status; walls that increase social and political inequality are always undesirable. Hence, he advocates abandoning not only the melting pot idea but also multiculturalism (in which, according to Marcuse, equal treatment often results in bland egalitarianism, where the essence of differences is played down or ignored), in favor of a mosaic formulation, in which differences are highlighted but presumptively seen as parts of a larger pattern that makes sense in its totality.

Myron Weiner is also interested in the study of immigrant integration. He does not try to define the desirable patterns of integration, but focuses on ways of achieving it, assuming that each country knows its special meaning of the term. He has studied immigration and integration in many countries and has been able to bring to his analysis illustrations from the US, the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Israel and other countries. He suggests several plausible hypotheses regarding the determinants of immigrant integration, dividing them into three categories. First is the willingness of a society to absorb immigrants, as expressed by its social contract with the newcomers, that is, the specification of the conditions under which the immigrants may enter the country (including what is expected of them and what in turn is promised to them by the government, especially regarding conditions for obtaining citizenship). Second, is the level of commitment of the immigrants to their new society. Third, and often most important, is the combination of objective circumstances at the time of entry. Most salient among these is the condition of the economy and whether or not it provides opportunities for mobility to people with the kind of drive, education and capabilities that the immigrants bring; also important is whether the stream of immigrants is sufficiently diversified, or the numbers from one source are not large enough to enable the immigrants to build permanent, self-contained enclaves. Weiner argues

that many of these factors, though by no means all, can be affected by state policies; yet, due to conflicting political attitudes and the difficulty of fine-tuning these policies, especially in slow growth economies, the integration of immigrants in most countries remains problematic and conflictive.

Part II, New Immigrants in New Circumstances, opens with Herbert Gans' analysis of 'the myth of nearly automatic immigrant success' in America, against the background of changes in the economy that are typical of a post-industrial society. Gans focuses on the children, 'the second generation' of poor immigrants, especially dark-skinned ones. According to his analysis, they will not be willing or even able to take low-wage, long-hour 'immigrant' jobs as their parents did. Hence, his scenario for the future is that they, and the young men among them in particular, may join Blacks and Hispanics among those already excluded, apparently permanently, from the mainstream economy. The paper also deals with the relations between ethnicity and economic conditions in the US, and with the continued relevance of old theories of assimilation and acculturation under the new circumstances. His second scenario is that in the future, acculturation of immigrants will be more partial or segmented than in the past. All the issues raised by Gans in his analysis of the US society seem to be relevant to other post-industrial societies experiencing immigration of poor people, because all of them are living through the turbulent transitional period between the industrial age and a new era. As mentioned in the opening chapter of the book, this period is characterized by a shrinking number of jobs in the mainstream economy, an attribute which may support Gans' first scenario, and also by legitimized diversification of life styles which may corroborate the second one.

Even though many of the immigrants to North America in the last decade have been legal, skilled and highly-skilled workers, it is the growing numbers of illegal, unskilled immigrants that generate public debate as well as scholarly publications. William Clark is among those who are worried about the magnitude and composition of the new immigrants, especially those who are 'undocumented'. In his article Clark raises local, national and global concerns. Writing from Southern California, he sees the heart of the problem on the local level in the very high direct costs that have to be borne by counties and cities which attract large streams of immigrants, while the state, and especially the Federal government, enjoy most of the benefits. On the national level, Clark joins those who argue that divisiveness and separation are rapidly growing in the receiving countries. Clark also draws global conclusions, according to

which neither barriers nor changes in the immigration laws and programs can succeed in preventing the continuing stream of illegal migrants from arriving at their intended destinations. That means that international borders become permeable barriers for global redistribution of wealth in the post-industrial world. Because this is a central issue in many countries, it may justify global responsibility. Clark draws an analogy between global obligation for the environment and a desired global responsibility for handling international migration, because of the overwhelming impact of both on human welfare.

Part III focuses on the unique experience of Israel. This small, developed country is experiencing the arrival of a huge wave of immigrants (compared to its population), a large proportion of which constitutes a highly-skilled labor force, moving from its country of origin in search of better economic opportunities and more political freedom. In the first half of the 1990s, the five million citizens of Israel received 600 000 new immigrants, most of them from the former USSR. About two-thirds of these former USSR citizens came from the European republics, and one-third from the Asian republics. Compared with the Israeli population, they have fewer children, somewhat more elderly people, and a larger working-age population, with a dominant tendency to the upper part (45–64) of this age group. The most salient characteristic of this population of immigrants is its large 'human capital', expressed in its occupational distribution: about 75 per cent of those of working age declared that in their countries of origin they were occupied in academic and technical professions; some 20 per cent of those of labor age were engineers and 3 per cent medical doctors, doubling the number of persons with this kind of training in Israel.

Karnit Flug and Nitza Kasir examine the extent to which the Israeli labor market has succeeded in using this large amount of human capital which arrived so unexpectedly. Their point of reference is Israel's notable success in absorbing the former wave of immigrants from the USSR, who arrived during the 1970s with a similar occupational structure. In the former wave, there was little unemployment among the immigrants after 2–3 years in Israel, and 60 per cent of them were employed in their former occupations; most of the others remained in their occupational category but moved downward: engineers became technicians, technicians became skilled workers and so on. Both unemployment and the rate of change were expected to be much higher in the 1990s, because the current influx was much larger and the labor market had been saturated with the kinds of occupations the immigrants brought with them. As it turned out, the rate of

unemployment among the immigrants was very high at the beginning, but dropped quickly, so that in their third year in the country the rate was similar to the general rate in Israel; however, most highly-educated immigrants – close to 70 per cent of those employed – could not find a job in their former occupation. This is a great loss for the country and a source of extreme personal agony for the immigrants. Although the authors, like most economists, do not support high intervention of the government in the market in general, and in immigrant absorption in particular, they do recommend governmental support for immigrant retraining programs. In order to make better use of the new human capital, not only should the immigrants change and adapt, but the local economy must do so as well. For this purpose, they recommend that the government facilitate processes of specialization in high-tech industries (processes which have already been developing in the Israeli economy) and by this indirect method increase the employment of professional immigrants, especially engineers, by the private sector.

Judith Shuval and Judith Bernstein studied one group of professional immigrants – medical doctors. In 1990–4, about 13 000 doctors immigrated to Israel from the former USSR, doubling the number of physicians in the country, that had already been higher than the per capita average in Europe before they arrived. This is a case of a highly-skilled group of professionals, with a high level of occupational commitment (as indicated by the empirical research), facing an extremely limited job market in their target country. The social system they enter continues to observe its own values and interests, which hardly change with the immigrants arrival. The burden of change is on them. They have to confront the painful choice between occupational change and unemployment. Women and older doctors are likely to be particularly vulnerable in terms of their occupational integration and consequent well-being.

Immigrants tend to concentrate in large cities. The larger cities of the post-industrial countries are going through processes of economic restructuring which involve changes in the structure of the job market; these changes occur in parallel with changes in the characteristics of the populations of the inner cities. While in the past the cities attracted poor immigrants who joined their poor incumbent populations, in recent years they have also been attracting local gentrifiers and highly-skilled immigrants. Such processes of change are taking place in Tel-Aviv, the city in and around which 40 per cent of the Israeli population live, and Gila Menahem studied them. She interviewed new immigrants and found that in accordance with what was expected in a post-industrial economy, it was difficult for them to find industrial jobs in the city, the economy of which

tends towards advanced services. Moreover, the polarization typical of post-industrial societies also affected the immigrant job market; about a third found academic and professional jobs, a far smaller percentage held mildly prestigious jobs (clerks, sales people), while many, in spite of their high level of education, experienced sharp downward mobility. As for housing, the immigrants could find dwelling units in several central neighborhoods of Tel-Aviv, but wherever the process of gentrification had been gaining control, their penetration was blocked and they were pushed toward less attractive areas of the city. Menahem concludes that a deliberate rehabilitation effort in their neighborhoods is required, if the central and/or local governments are interested in making the new immigrants permanent residents of the city of Tel-Aviv.

Shlomo Hasson ends the Israeli section with a discussion of empirical research into the critical question of spatial dispersion of immigrants. It is critical, because the place the immigrant chooses to settle in determines to a large extent the opportunities open to him or her, and, from a different viewpoint, the potential of his or her positive or negative contribution to the host society. Hasson finds that unlike immigrants to other countries who tend in the first years, or even the first generation in the new country, to choose their place of settlement according to socio-psychological attachments, the new immigrants to Israel from the former USSR behave differently. Within a very short period of time, two to three years in Israel, they tend to change from social optimizers to economic optimizers; disregarding their social relationships with relatives and friends, they select a place of residence on the basis of job and housing opportunities. This finding may have relevance to other developed countries, which have recently received larger numbers of highly-skilled immigrants, whose behavior may differ from what we know from studies of unskilled immigrants. If governments want to influence the geographical dispersion of their immigrants, they will have a better chance of doing so with skilled laborers, and, according to Hasson, they may do it indirectly, by influencing the local availability of appropriate new jobs and inexpensive housing.

Finally, Part IV analyzes the experience of four highly-developed countries with a long tradition of integrating immigrants. Stanley Lieberson derives lessons from the US experience. From a historical viewpoint, he sees it as a success story. Based on empirical evidence and some speculation, he mentions several possible sources of this exceptional success: improvement in the quality of life in comparison with that in the sending country; large potential for mobility, especially inter-generational mobility; minimal legal and political distinctions made between older settlers

and immigrants, including their children; and minimal official pressure on the immigrants to assimilate. He argues that government policies played only a small role in these processes. With a few important exceptions, the government was quite passive, despite considerable agitation from the receiving population. His arguments raise questions about the appropriateness of government policies for enhancing immigrant integration, and about the assumption that ethnic conflicts cannot be reduced without deliberate public intervention.

Although Australia is as much an immigrant society as the US, its experience is very different. Laksiri Jayasuriya analyzes its history and focuses on its current problems. He relates that until the mass migration of the post World War II period, Australia had succeeded in preserving its 'white Australia' policy and the philosophy of 'total assimilation' and 'Anglo' conformity. In the 1950s and 1960s, non-Anglo (but mostly European) immigrants were admitted, but it was not until the early 1970s that a non-discriminatory policy of immigrant recruitment and the philosophy of multiculturalism were established. As adopted by the Australian governments, multiculturalism legitimized cultural differences in the private domain, but disapproved group organization in the public domain, trying to prevent the formation of political ethnic interest groups. It seemed to work for some time, but the introduction of new factors that accompanied 'economic restructuring' – the talisman of a new socioeconomic era – have disrupted the relatively calm situation. The demand for a highly-skilled labor force that increased the arrival of immigrants of Asian origin and the downturn in the economy in the 1980s created new problems and aggravated older ones. According to Jayasuriya, multiculturalism – where limited to cultural pluralism – has failed as an experiment in social engineering, at least in the context of 'economic restructuring'. New ethnic collectivities are being created, especially when the offspring of immigrants grow; they have interests, needs and aspirations, and forcefully search for new ways to express them and fight for them in the public arena.

In the final chapter, John Crowley addresses the experiences of Britain and France. These neighboring European countries, both of which have received significant immigration from less-developed countries since the 1950s, particularly from their former colonies, are similar with respect to the formal rights of immigrants. However, they are quite dissimilar in that it is widely accepted in Britain, but overwhelmingly denied in France, that formal rights are not sufficient to ensure the integration they grant immigrants. Their attitudes to immigration remained influenced by opposite (albeit often implicit) paradigms. France has only slowly come to accept

the broad irreversibility of migration and the contradictions of the long-dominant 'migration-labor' model. In Britain, on the contrary, immigration has (by elite consensus, if not public opinion) long been recognized as permanent. This goes some way towards explaining the centrality of race relations issues in British policy and, conversely, their marginalization in France. More generally, it links up with the broader ideological climate, France remaining faithful to an essentially assimilationist ideal that Britain has largely abandoned. Both countries are struggling with the difficulties of adapting their policies to the new circumstances of the post-industrial era, in which immigrants are legitimate social actors, rather than a socio-economic phenomenon.

In Britain and France, as in most other nation-states of the wealthier parts of the world, the issues of immigration and integration are very high on the national agenda. The democratic traditions of these countries predicate freedom of movement, and their economic policies support free transfer of means of production, including labor force; hence, they could have been expected to open their borders to all potential settlers. However, what the essays in this book teach us is that forecasts of extensive immigration of populations, which are very different from existing national, ethnic or religious majority, frighten large segments of the local inhabitants. In fact, the number of immigrants currently entering the wealthier countries is very modest (except in the US), but their enormous potential is frequently perceived as a great threat to national identity and political stability. Technical assistance and development investments are channeled to less wealthy parts of the world, with the aim of creating substitutes for emigration. But these efforts have achieved so little in comparison to the growing needs of those countries, that most experts doubt that anything can stop the redistribution of the world's wealth through mass migrations of its population.

A plausible scenario for the future is that economic globalization, which has already been very influential in post-industrial societies, will be followed by immigration-driven social globalization in these societies. Mass immigration movements and consequent intra-national diversification will create a more flexible global structure, composed of communities with various degrees of control over their members. Instead of clinging to their present citizenship, which currently is a necessary condition for attaining social security rights as well as for participating in the democratic process, the inhabitants of this new world will freely wander among its various communities, carrying their extended personal rights with them.

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1 Immigration and Integration in Post-Industrial Societies: Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses

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The tendency to migrate is a basic human characteristic. The origin of *homo sapiens* has not been ascertained beyond all doubt, but experts seem to agree that our species first made its appearance on the African continent and that it has been spreading over the planet ever since. The current dispersion of people around the world has been created through many small- and large-scale migration movements: raids, invasions, conquests, slave trade and colonization as well as pilgrimage and settlement beyond frontier areas.

Throughout human history, migration movements have created problems and conflicts that have been studied by social scientists. Now, when we are entering a new stage in human history, the new post-industrial era, this chapter is intended to initiate discussion of the issues of migration in the context of a young, yet largely unfamiliar age. The chapter opens with a characterization of the new era, continues with quantitative and qualitative analyses of the economic, social and cultural aspects of immigration and integration and ends with a question: will the present economic globalization be followed by immigration-driven social globalization in post-industrial societies?

CHARACTERIZING THE POST-INDUSTRIAL ERA

For the purposes of this discussion, the new era is described in terms of five socioeconomic phenomena: demographic (age structure) changes, global orientation, restructuring of the economy, diversification of life styles and increasing disparities between haves and have-nots.

The salient demographic changes are decreasing fertility rates and aging of the population (UN, 1994). The average age of the population in the post-industrial societies is climbing, the number of labor-age persons is declining, and the number of the elderly, especially in the oldest subgroup, is increasing. This aging process stands in sharp contrast to the demographic evolution in the less developed countries.

Global orientation is a major trend and hallmark of the new era. This global orientation is most marked in the economic sphere, where market forces are pushing towards the lowering if not the total abolition of traditional trade barriers (mostly national boundaries) that inhibit free transportation of raw materials and finished products. Advanced communication technologies are making these changes possible, economically as well as culturally and logistically. The innovative use of mass media raises people's level of expectations and reinforces their inclination to move in order to realize these expectations; the development of modern means of transportation and the declining costs of transporting persons and goods make movement from place to place easier than it has ever been. A worldwide (global) search for opportunity has become a realistic alternative not only for directors of large corporations, but for non-skilled workers as well.

Restructuring of the economy is another main characteristic. For more than 200 years, the economics of Western societies was based mainly on industrial production of goods. In the last few decades, we have been living through the process of 'tertiarization' of the economy, that is, the rapid transfer of a large share of the labor force from industrial production to services. The deindustrialization process is accompanied by tough competition between large and small corporations and also between regions and cities. High unemployment rates seem to have become a permanent structural phenomenon. At the same time, the share of the informal (shadow) economy is growing in most highly-developed countries; according to several studies, it reached 5–12 per cent of the GNP in many OECD countries towards 1980 (Schneider, 1992), and has grown considerably since then.

Diversification of lifestyles is highly typical of our times. While in traditional societies there was usually one 'correct' and possible lifestyle for each person in a specific social group, in post-industrial societies there are more and more *legitimized* modes of life from which a person can choose. Mode of life is determined by a combination of choices in the following areas: value orientation (religious versus secular, for example), level of ethnic affiliation, family life, work patterns, leisure practice and residential preferences (Carmon, 1995).

Last but not least are the increasing disparities between the haves and the have-nots, and the absolute increase in the number of have-nots.

Economists have conventionally expected the benefits of development to 'filter down' to everybody. This may ultimately come true, but for now, rapid changes related to the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society in the last quarter of the present century have caused unprecedented rates of unemployment in the highly-developed countries, a growing number of low-wage and non-secured jobs in their large cities (Sassen, 1991), and forecasts of worsening conditions for their middle-class populations (Kennedy, 1993). In both the US and Britain, inequalities in income are now larger than at any time since the 1930s (*Economist*, 1994). Disparities have been increasing within the post-industrial countries (especially within the large and prosperous 'world cities') as well as between them and the Third-World countries. The ratio of income level between the poorest and the richest 20 per cent of world population was 30:1 in 1960 and 59:1 in 1990 (UN, 1992).

These five characteristics of post-industrial societies are strongly related to the number of international immigrants and to the processes of their integration (or non-integration) in the receiving societies, as explained below.

MASS MIGRATION TO POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES?

The number of immigrants is growing worldwide. In the period from 1945–70, 100 million immigrants moved from country to country – an average of four million a year; by1990, the number reached 120 million – an average of six million a year (World Media, 1991). Teitelbaum and Russell (1994) collected data from around the world and came to the conclusion that in the early 1990s at least 100 million immigrants were living outside their countries of birth or citizenship (including both permanent and temporary immigrants as well as refugees). About half of these immigrated to the developed countries of the world (approximately 23 million to Europe, 20 million to North America, and 4 million to Oceania). The present study focuses on this half.

The increasing number of immigrants to the developed countries is related first and foremost to the widening gap in the rates of unemployment and underemployment, as well as in the standards of living between the countries of the North and those of the South and (to a lesser extent) between countries of the West and East. However, had it not been for the declining work force in the rich countries, due to the above-mentioned demographic trends, and were it not for the need of these countries to recruit large numbers of workers, the new laborers would not have come (Alonso, 1987).

The restructuring of the economy of the post-industrial countries is creating a large demand for highly skilled workers, especially those trained in the natural sciences, computers, engineering and medicine. Young people in Western countries, however, prefer to attend schools of business, management and law; as a result, there are many openings in certain high-skill occupations. At the same time, and especially in order to cope with the tough competition in the international markets, there is a demand for unskilled, low-paid workers, to take the jobs that local residents spurn. This increased demand encourages immigration to the developed countries, both of university graduates, who find it difficult to land an appropriate job in their less developed countries, and of unskilled young men and women, who have only a scarce chance of making a living in the overpopulated countries of their birth.

Most of these trends are common to all of the developed countries, but there are also remarkable differences between North America and Europe. While the US and Canada have always been large importers of immigrants, Europe was traditionally an exporter. It was not until the twentieth century, and especially following World War II, that Europe became a region of net in-migration. In the last four decades, the area of net in-migration in Europe has progressively grown (Oberg, 1993). Waves of immigrants came to Northern and Central Europe in the 1960s and the early 1970s, at first from southern Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, and then from Yugoslavia and Turkey (King, 1993). In the late 1970s, 1980s and the early 1990s, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the European countries which have a positive migration balance, and a much larger share of the new immigrants started to come from the Third-World countries. Most non-European immigrants come from North Africa; the former imperial nations (England, France, Holland) also take in immigrants from their erstwhile colonies of Asia and Africa.

Reliable statistics are scarce, mainly because the definition of foreigners, immigrants and citizens is not exclusive. All in all, the total number of immigrants in Europe is not large. France (1990), for example, had 4.13 million immigrants (with or without French nationality) among its resident population of 53 million (Ogden,1993); in England and Wales (1981) 3.5 million persons out of 48.5 million residents were born elsewhere (Coleman, 1992); in Italy (1990) there were about 1 million non-European immigrants (permanent and temporary) among 61 million (Barsotti and Lecchini, 1992). Oberg (1993) concludes a West European survey by saying that the present stream of immigrants includes just around one non-European immigrant per 2000 Europeans per year. He

warns his audience, that 'without immigration and with a continuously low fertility pattern, almost every third inhabitant of West Europe will be over the age of 65 in 2050', and according to a more 'pessimistic' scenario, 44 per cent will belong to this age group (Oberg, 1992)

The numbers in the US, Canada and Australia are different. The US admitted more than 500 000 legal immigrants on a yearly average in the 1980s and is expected to admit around 1 million annually in the 1990s. Canada expects annual levels of immigration to rise to 250 000 in 1993–5. Australia's immigration was about 100 000 in 1992 (Teitelbaum and Russell,1994). These are far larger ratios of new immigrants to permanent residents than those of the Old World. Moreover, while in the 1920s around 95 per cent of the immigrants to the US were European in origin, in the 1960s about 50 per cent came from Third-World countries, and in the 1980s the share of Third-World immigrants grew to about 85 per cent of all immigrants to the US (Clark, 1996). Similar changes in the composition of the populations of immigrants have been reported from Canada and Australia.

A common phenomenon in the highly-developed countries of both the New and the Old World is the growing number of illegal immigrants. They tend to take the worst jobs on the market, jobs that native residents refuse to accept. When they cannot find ordinary jobs, they make their living in the growing informal market of the post-industrial societies. As of 1993, there were approximately 3.5 million illegal residents in the US, most of whom came from Latin America (Teitelbaum and Russell, 1994). The numbers (including relative numbers) are smaller in Europe, but the social tensions they create seem to be stronger. In France, for example, there were 300 000 *clandestins* (illegal immigrants) in the early 1980s; Silverman (quoted by Ogden 1993:114) claimed that 'the persistent and misleading confusion between "illegals" and "immigrant workers" has never been adequately resolved: not only has "immigrant" been increasingly reduced to "Arab", but also immigrants have continued to be identified "as a problem, outside the law and outside the nation"'.

The receiving countries have all tried to curtail illegal immigration. The US Congress passed the 1986 Immigration Act, with such an aim in mind. Following this Act, about 1.8 million persons filed applications for legalization on the basis of illegal residence in the United States prior to 1982; an additional 1.3 million seasonal workers also applied for legalization. According to Muller (1993), the Act and the following processes of legalization did not succeed in substantially reducing illegal entry. In anticipation of its partial unification on 31 December 1992, the

European Community strongly urged its member countries to tighten up their immigration policies and take special measures to reduce the number of illegal immigrants in so far as possible. In spite of these efforts, it seems that as long as the strong pressure generated by unemployment in the sending countries continues to exist and as long as there is a demand for cheap labor in the formal and informal economies of the receiving societies, even harsh measures will not be able to stop the flow of illegal immigrants.

While most of the workers among the illegal immigrants are low-skilled, the percentage of highly-skilled and very highly-skilled workers among legal immigrants to post-industrial countries is on the rise. According to a UN report (1992:55), the percentage of skilled workers among immigrants from the developing countries to the US was 45 per cent in 1966 and grew to 75 per cent in 1986, while in Canada the comparable figures were 12 per cent and 46 per cent. Both countries have recently changed their immigration regulations in order to admit a larger proportion of entrepreneurs and skilled workers. The brain drain is increasing, not only from the poor countries to the rich ones, but also from European countries to North America. This is another characteristic feature of immigration in the post-industrial era.

Thus, the number of immigrants is growing and their characteristics are changing. However, the data (especially European data) does not support the designation 'mass migration' that has recently been adopted by European books (for example: King, 1993) and conferences (for example: 'Mass Migration in Europe' held in Laxenburg, Austria, in March 1992). As Sture Oberg (1992), a specialist on world population, wrote, what we are witnessing is 'small numbers but large potentials'.

For the time being, only a little more than two per thousand are leaving the former USSR each year, and the same small proportion per year is received in Germany, the main target area in Western Europe for former citizens of the Communist countries (Ibid.). This ratio is expected to grow in the future, but the main population pressures on Western Europe as well as on the developed countries of the New World will not come from Eastern Europe, but rather from the developing countries. Some 38 million extra people join the labor force each year in the countries of the South, in which more than 700 million are already unemployed or underemployed; this means that one billion new jobs must be created or improved by the end of the decade – almost equivalent to the total population of the North (UN, 1992: 54). The fear caused by these facts has turned immigration and integration into one of the most contentious issues of the late twentieth century.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Does immigration bring about economic gains or losses? This question should be discussed both from the individual point of view of the immigrant and his/her immediate family, and from the national points of view of the sending as well as the receiving societies.

The common cause of international migration is the desire of the immigrants to improve their economic status. In the past, most of them succeeded in attaining this goal ultimately, if not immediately (i.e. inter-generational mobility). Will this trend continue in the post-industrial society? The answer may differ according to the assets brought by the immigrant, especially education and professional training. As mentioned above, there has been a large percentage of skilled and highly-skilled persons in the immigrating labor force in recent years; physicians and para-medics, engineers and technicians, trained managers and other professionals may still find open channels of economic mobility. For unskilled and poor immigrants the prospects are gloomier by far. If the poor immigrants are ready to take low-wage, long-hours, dead-end jobs, there are enough such jobs available in the present economy, and it seems that there will be many jobs of this kind in years to come. The shortage of jobs in post-industrial societies is at the intermediate level, the level that should be available to the children of the immigrants. Gans (1996) has developed the theory of 'second generation decline': it is anticipated that children of immigrants, raised under the cultural aspirations and work expectations of the receiving society, will refuse to take typical 'immigrant jobs'; this unwillingness, coupled with the scarcity of secure jobs in the primary labor market, is expected to make many of them – particularly young males – join the hard core of the unemployed, and consequently live on welfare, at the least, if they don't become involved with drugs and crime as well. Thus, faith in the nearly automatic straight-line advancement of immigrants, so common in American and other immigrant pools, is being shattered.

Gender is a salient issue in the context of economic adaptation of immigrants. Women make up nearly half of the international migrant population. In the European OECD countries, women constitute the larger part of foreign-born populations. Although women are often thought of as 'passive movers', who migrate to join family members, research has found that economic rather than personal or social considerations predominate. Despite strong evidence of women's occupation in the labor market, immigration policies still tend to assume that all migrants are men and that women are 'dependents'. Women's right to work may be severely

restricted, access to support systems and social services may be limited, and rights to naturalization may be indirect and dependent on the status of the spouse. The level of expectation of immigrant women, like that of immigrant men, tends to be high, their prospects of finding some kind of job and bringing home some money are fairly good, but the road to progress is frequently blocked for them. Social networks, strong bonds of kinship and the extension of traditional social structures to the new settings, coupled with the special restrictions applied to married women immigrants in many countries and the general discrimination against women in the labor markets of the developed countries – combine to reduce the chances of success for women. Thus, unlike the situation for men, the before-after migration balance is showing just a slight (if any) improvement for women (UNFPA, 1993).

Consideration of macroeconomics in place of the micro-view of the individual immigrant leads the discussion into different directions. From ancient days, emigration has helped to reduce the number of persons who have to be fed in regions with limited resources. From this narrow point of view, emigration still assists poor countries. Now, however, the sending countries often lose skilled personnel and the problem of 'brain drain' may be severe. On the positive side though, wherever skilled immigrants keep in touch with their country of origin, cultural links are created which encourage much-needed technology transfers. In addition, they sometimes play a major role as investors in what they often continue to consider their homeland, even if a long time has passed since their forebears left it. Technology transfers and investments by ethnic Chinese citizens of the US and Canada, and even more frequently citizens of Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and others) have played a leading role in the recent rapid economic growth of the People's Republic of China (Financial Times, 1992).

Remittances – the hard currency earnings that immigrants send to family members and others in the country they left – compensate at least in part for the loss of a trained labor force. In 1990 alone, the official total was US$71 billion; the net transfer to the developing countries equaled US$31 billion (Teitelbaum and Russell, 1994). In Jordan, Pakistan and Sudan remittances were equivalent to more than 20 per cent of imports for that year; in Egypt, they were the most significant source of foreign currency income in the 1980s (UN, 1992). Individual households clearly benefit from money received from abroad. Less clear is the impact on the country as a whole. There has been criticism that most of these funds do not go into productive investment, but are used for speculative activities or to finance conspicuous consumption and import of luxury goods. But most expendi-

tures can add to demand and stimulate the local economy. A study conducted in Egypt suggested a coefficient of 2.2 for remittances – that is, remittances of 1 million Egyptian pounds increased the GNP by 2.2 million pounds; a similar study in Pakistan found a multiplier of 2.4 (Ibid.).

In spite of this stream of cash to the sending states, the receiving countries are the main economic beneficiaries. For example: the US Congressional Research Service estimated that in 1981–2 the developing countries as a whole lost an investment of $20 000 for each skilled migrant – $646 million in total. Some of this returns as remittances, but not on a scale sufficient to compensate for the losses (UN,1992). Other economic benefits to the receiving societies take the form of revenues generated at all levels of government. Opponents of immigration frequently claim that the immigrants do not raise enough taxes to pay for the many services they use – social security benefits, health services and so on. Detailed studies in several countries have provided evidence to the contrary. Akbari (1989) studied the Canadian case and found that immigrants paid (slightly) more taxes than they received in transfer payments. Steinmann (1992) compared the contributed and received revenues of citizens and foreigners in Germany; he reported that the foreigners paid slightly more (taxes, health insurance, etc.) and received far less in transfer payments (mainly because of pensions received by citizens). A recent American study (Moreno-Evans, 1992, reported by Clark, 1993) shows that the Federal government of the US benefits directly from immigration because of the revenues collected from immigrants, but that local districts bear a disproportionately high cost for serving immigrants who arrive as a result of federal policies, laws and decisions. At issue are the disparities in geographic distribution, which create a heavy burden on regions and municipalities with large and often poor immigrant populations.

The dilemma stems from the tendency of immigrants to congregate in particular locations, especially in or near the large metropolitan centers of Western countries. In the 1980s and 1990s, ten metropolitan areas in the US, which housed 17 per cent of the nation's population attracted 55 per cent of its legal immigrants and probably a larger percentage of the illegal ones; first among them were Los Angeles and New York (Enchautegui, 1993). Figures from the 1980s show concentrations of 'foreign population' in certain large European cities: Luxembourg – 43 per cent; Geneva – 29 per cent; Frankfurt, Antwerp, Brussels and Amsterdam – 21–24 per cent (White, 1993). Voices in favor of closing the gates for additional immigrants are frequently heard in these large cities of mixed population.

In the highly-mixed regions, immigrants are frequently blamed for displacing veteran citizens in work places and for a potential decline in wages

due to the excess labor force. Research does not support such claims. Studies by Simon (1989) and Borjas (1990) found that the American labor market was sufficiently segmented to escape noticeable influence by immigrant workers; both rejected the hypothesis that immigration caused unemployment in the US. Their studies were criticized for using aggregated data, but a desegregated analysis of the local areas that are large recipients of immigrants pointed in the same direction. Enchautegui (1993) made an ethnic-specific analysis of such local areas and showed that the wages of Anglo and Hispanic men increased in areas of high immigration; Blacks did not lose, but they did not gain, either.

The general conclusion is clear: the receiving countries and their citizens enjoy great economic gains which result from international migration. There is clear evidence of the financial gains, and also various indications of the contribution of immigrants to the economic vitality and the competitiveness of the highly developed countries. According to Sassen (1994), an expert on cities in the world economy, immigrants have contributed an enormous amount of energy to small-scale, low-profit entrepreneurship, which is necessary to meet the demand for goods and services that larger standardized firms can no longer handle, given the low profit levels and the increased costs of operation. One can see this in Paris, Tokyo, Toronto and Frankfurt, as well as in New York. In this context, she says, immigrants are almost akin to a rapid development force.

Yet, immigrants were not and are not welcome. The main reasons for this are to be found in non-economic spheres.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Veteran residents usually see and treat newcomers as intruders. The German writer and essayist Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1992) illustrates this by a story of two passengers in a railway compartment, who have made themselves at home for a long journey, their clothes hung up, their luggage stowed and the remaining empty seats next to them covered with their newspapers and bags. Suddenly, the door opens and two new passengers enter. Their arrival is not welcome. There is a feeling of reluctance when it comes to clearing the vacant seats to make room for the new arrivals. There is an air of solidarity between the first two passengers, even though they are not acquainted. They confront the newcomers as a group; it is their territory which is at stake. They behave as if they were natives who are laying claim to the entire space for themselves. Any new arrival is treated as an intruder. Enzensberger's conclusion is that group egoism and

xenophobia are anthropological constants, preceding reason. The fact that these traits are universally present indicates that they are older than most known forms of social order. *Prima facie,* it means that immigration always causes a conflict.

The way to reduce the conflict is to facilitate rapid integration of the immigrants into the receiving society. However, for many – probably a majority – of the immigrants counted above, the concept of integration may be irrelevant. If integration is the process by which a person adapts himself to permanent settlement in a new environment, then it is irrelevant for most of the temporary migrant workers, for the asylum seekers, and for the numerous illegal migrants, many of whom are in constant mobility.

Even if our discussion is confined to long-term immigrants, researchers and policy-makers differ with regard to the desirable form and level of their integration. Through years of study and public debate, three models of integration emerged: assimilation, melting pot and cultural pluralism. Different versions of these models can be identified in different times and countries, but the three can be described in general terms as follows.

Assimilation is a process by which immigrants adopt the cultural norms and lifestyles of the host society in a way that ultimately leads to the disappearance of the newcomers as a separate group. In this model, contact between the minority group of immigrants and the dominant culture results in a gradual process of change in the minority group (and not in the receiving society), and its members gradually abandon their culture of origin in order to adapt themselves to the host society. This process has frequently been described in terms of conformity and/or acculturation. The numerical weight of the members of the dominant society, the frequency and intensity of the contacts and the passage of time were all considered assimilation-accelerating factors (Taft, 1963, 1985). The model was formulated by Robert Park (1928, 1950), the founder of the School of Sociology at the University of Chicago. He and his leading students, including Louis Wirth and Franklin Fraizer, assumed that assimilation was not only natural and inevitable, but would be all for the best (Glazer, 1993). Later researchers (Lieberson, 1961; Gordon, 1964; Barth and Noel, 1972) made the model more complex and more sophisticated, but generally agreed with respect to assimilation as the final result.

Social reality did not support the idea of inevitable assimilation. Empirical evidence, together with the unpopularity of assimilative ideas paved the way to the concept of the melting pot. The term had been known for decades: America was the great melting pot in which all the races of Europe were melted down and reshaped. But it was not until the 1940s that American researchers started to use it frequently as the title of a new

model of integration, a model which allows two-way cultural influences. The final result is still a society which is culturally and ethnically homogeneous (allows for religious heterogeneity) (Herberg, 1955), but the construction of this new society is based on the interaction of all the existing cultures. The different ethnic groups of immigrants are not considered – as they were in the assimilation model – passive objects, but rather active subjects, who participate in the formation of the new nation (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963).

The ideal of a melting pot that included, in addition to a cultural mix, the creation of a new nation through biological interbreeding, seemed to work for most of the European groups in the US, but has never materialized for the Blacks, the largest minority group, with the deepest roots in America (with the exception of native American Indians). The Afro-Americans continued to suffer from segregation, discrimination and blocked social mobility. Many consider their suffering as proof of the failure of both the assimilation and the melting pot ideals.

Meanwhile, new ideas about coexistence of different ethnic groups were taking shape, with UNESCO leading its international dissemination. 'Union in Diversity' was the leading slogan of the Havana international conference in 1956 (Borrie, 1959), calling for cultural differentiation within a framework of social unity. Gradually, the model of cultural pluralism has taken center stage. It allows heterogeneity not as a transitory state, but rather as a permanent phenomenon in society. It assumes that the different groups of society influence each other reciprocally, that together they create the national space in which all participants are citizens with equal rights and with which all of them identify. The goal of the integration process was redefined as promoting civic unity while protecting ethnic diversity (Fuchs, 1993).

All three models take a macro viewpoint of the receiving society. They ignore the possibility that the process of immigrant integration can take different forms in different parts of the society (geographically and socially) or where it relates to different types of immigrants. They also ignore the wishes of the immigrants themselves as determinants of their integration or non-integration. The present behavior of immigrants in various developed countries indicates that disregarding their motivation is a mistake. It is especially so when immigrants of the same origin constitute a group in a particular locality which is large enough for their motivations to play a decisive role in the processes discussed.

Even though Glazer (1993) believes that the forces pressing towards assimilation have not lost power in American society, he admits that they have never worked for the Blacks. As for the Hispanics and Asian-

Americans, who seem to have been better accepted by the white majority, he found that they chose to establish or preserve an institutional base for a separate identity. The same tendency of preserving a separate identity, not only by means of religious and cultural institutions but also – at least to some extent – by having ethnic-based sources of livelihood (ethnic businesses) and political institutions, is reported by studies of Mexicans in Los Angeles, of Chinese immigrants in Vancouver and of Turks in Hamburg. It might have been encouraged by prejudice and discrimination derived from the majority population; but it seems to stem mainly from the free will of the immigrants and their ability to openly express this will in societies that have legitimized diversity of all kinds.

Diversification is the name of the game. It used to be an either/or situation: either you stay in your country of origin or you immigrate and integrate, that is, settle permanently and take upon you the identity of another nation. In the post-industrial era we are witnessing a multiple-alternative situation; the two main alternatives are temporary vs permanent migration, and within each of these there is a diversity of immigrants. Within the category of permanent international immigration, even within the same country, there is more than one pattern of integration; different groups of immigrants can make their choices between assimilation or the preservation of specific parts of their original culture, and even their original institutions. Within the temporary category, there are several common ways: a migrant may be part of the legal economy by having one of the permits for highly qualified personnel in the corporate sector (see the presentation of The Euroman in *World Media*, 1992), or by having a work permit for unskilled work in agriculture, construction and so on; another way of joining the sector of temporary migrants is to find a living in the growing shadow economy (the informal economy) of the developed countries. The lifestyles of people in these different immigrant groups vary greatly one from the other. Last, but not least, the world now has a new type of immigrant: people who have homes, careers and cultural roots in more than one society (see the report of the Puerto Ricans as multiple movers by Scheff and Hernandez, 1993). Where does this variety take us? The following discussion will cover this question.

CONCLUSION

Global orientation and diversification have been discussed in this chapter as megatrends of the post-industrial era. For conclusion, two hypotheses are suggested: the first is that the influence of these two megatrends will grow

immensely, not only on the economy, but also on the direction and content of social and political changes in the twenty-first century; the second is that international immigrants will serve as major carriers of these changes.

It seems that the greatest cultural transformation of our civilization is that we now look to the future rather than the past. Traditional societies were based on the past; each generation was expected to add just a drop to the accumulation of human knowledge, and thus, the complete transfer of knowledge from one generation to the next was considered to be of the utmost importance. In our world, in the context of very rapid development of science and technology, a considerable part of human knowledge is created within the lifetime of each generation (25 years). People are born into a rapidly changing world and they expect it to continue changing even more rapidly. Therefore, attention moves from studying the past and organizing life by the experience of the past to attempts at adaptation to the uncertain future.

Migration implies leaving the past and present and concentrating on the future. Researchers used to believe that potential immigrants compare job openings, wages and standards of living in their home countries with those in their target areas, and make their decisions accordingly. But if this is the case, how can we explain the continued immigration to the huge cities of the developing countries that cannot provide reasonable standards of living for many, if not most, of their residents? And how can we explain the movements to cities of the developed world in which most immigrants experience a sharp decline in their socioeconomic status? The answer is that migration decisions are based on hopes and expectations for the future, rather than on considerations of the present. In this sense, immigrants are indubitably representatives of the post-industrial period, the era of the future.

But has this not been true of immigrants in the past? Is there something unique about the immigrants of the new era? At least three trends are worth mentioning here. One is that the search for new opportunities is frequently made on a global scale, and this becomes true for non-skilled workers almost as much as for highly-skilled immigrants. The second is that the legitimation of cultural diversity may encourage immigrants to maintain their separate identities in their new homes, and in consequence, gradually alter the nature of the existing nations. The third is the changing concept of rights: in the past, immigrants were either potential citizens, who could expect to receive full citizenship rights, or foreigners who came to work for a limited period of time and had very few rights; today immigrants enjoy many rights by virtue of their mere presence in a country: welfare, education for their children, instruction in their own language, and appeal against deportation. Rights are increasingly defined in universal terms; 'voting rights are human rights', claimed the 1990 migrants' voting rights cam-

paign in Austria (Soyal, 1995). If trends continue to develop in the same direction and if the large potential of mass migration movements is realized, the outcome will be a new social and political order.

This chapter is devoted to the understanding of processes and does not deal directly with ways to ease the social turbulence caused by immigration, but let me note here that governments can – and to the best of my judgment – should play a major role in treating the issues discussed above. In spite of the rhetoric in favor of privatization and a reduction of the public sector, governments in the developed countries are highly involved in all spheres: service production (education, health, housing and welfare), guiding economic development (extensively, whether directly or indirectly), determining the standard of living of their citizens (through taxation and many other ways), and even shaping public and personal attitudes (appropriate nutrition and environmental conservation are two examples). These involved governments have no choice but to relate to issues of immigration: the number of immigrants, immigrant rights, and the dilemmas of integration and the appropriate governmental role in shaping it.

Other chapters in this book deal with these policy questions. This chapter ends with a theoretical question bearing on policy challenges: will the present economic globalization be followed by immigration-driven social globalization in the post-industrial societies? Following World War II, a hundred or so new nations were established which strengthened the semi-stable structure of a world composed of nation-states. Almost all of the human population was sorted and organized, not always neatly, according to principles of territoriality and citizenship. Will this structure give way to a more fluid one, in which national identities are blurred by affiliations transcending nationality? Will mass immigration movements, and the processes of intra-national diversification they cause, create a more flexible global structure, composed of communities of different size and various degrees of control over their members? Will the inhabitants of this new world move freely among its communities and, instead of clinging to their citizenship rights, carry with them wherever they go their extended human rights? These questions are left open.

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