1 Immigration and Integration in Post-Industrial Societies: Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses
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The tendency to migrate is a basic human characteristic. The origin of *homo sapiens* has not been ascertained beyond all doubt, but experts seem to agree that our species first made its appearance on the African continent and that it has been spreading over the planet ever since. The current dispersion of people around the world has been created through many small- and large-scale migration movements: raids, invasions, conquests, slave trade and colonization as well as pilgrimage and settlement beyond frontier areas.

Throughout human history, migration movements have created problems and conflicts that have been studied by social scientists. Now, when we are entering a new stage in human history, the new post-industrial era, this chapter is intended to initiate discussion of the issues of migration in the context of a young, yet largely unfamiliar age. The chapter opens with a characterization of the new era, continues with quantitative and qualitative analyses of the economic, social and cultural aspects of immigration and integration and ends with a question: will the present economic globalization be followed by immigration-driven social globalization in post-industrial societies?

CHARACTERIZING THE POST-INDUSTRIAL ERA

For the purposes of this discussion, the new era is described in terms of five socioeconomic phenomena: demographic (age structure) changes, global orientation, restructuring of the economy, diversification of life styles and increasing disparities between haves and have-nots.
The salient demographic changes are decreasing fertility rates and aging of the population (UN, 1994). The average age of the population in the post-industrial societies is climbing, the number of labor-age persons is declining, and the number of the elderly, especially in the oldest subgroup, is increasing. This aging process stands in sharp contrast to the demographic evolution in the less developed countries.

Global orientation is a major trend and hallmark of the new era. This global orientation is most marked in the economic sphere, where market forces are pushing towards the lowering if not the total abolition of traditional trade barriers (mostly national boundaries) that inhibit free transportation of raw materials and finished products. Advanced communication technologies are making these changes possible, economically as well as culturally and logistically. The innovative use of mass media raises people’s level of expectations and reinforces their inclination to move in order to realize these expectations; the development of modern means of transportation and the declining costs of transporting persons and goods make movement from place to place easier than it has ever been. A worldwide (global) search for opportunity has become a realistic alternative not only for directors of large corporations, but for non-skilled workers as well.

Restructuring of the economy is another main characteristic. For more than 200 years, the economics of Western societies was based mainly on industrial production of goods. In the last few decades, we have been living through the process of ‘tertiarization’ of the economy, that is, the rapid transfer of a large share of the labor force from industrial production to services. The deindustrialization process is accompanied by tough competition between large and small corporations and also between regions and cities. High unemployment rates seem to have become a permanent structural phenomenon. At the same time, the share of the informal (shadow) economy is growing in most highly-developed countries; according to several studies, it reached 5–12 per cent of the GNP in many OECD countries towards 1980 (Schneider, 1992), and has grown considerably since then.

Diversification of lifestyles is highly typical of our times. While in traditional societies there was usually one ‘correct’ and possible lifestyle for each person in a specific social group, in post-industrial societies there are more and more legitimized modes of life from which a person can choose. Mode of life is determined by a combination of choices in the following areas: value orientation (religious versus secular, for example), level of ethnic affiliation, family life, work patterns, leisure practice and residential preferences (Carmon, 1995).

Last but not least are the increasing disparities between the haves and the have-nots, and the absolute increase in the number of have-nots.
Economists have conventionally expected the benefits of development to 'filter down' to everybody. This may ultimately come true, but for now, rapid changes related to the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society in the last quarter of the present century have caused unprecedented rates of unemployment in the highly-developed countries, a growing number of low-wage and non-secured jobs in their large cities (Sassen, 1991), and forecasts of worsening conditions for their middle-class populations (Kennedy, 1993). In both the US and Britain, inequalities in income are now larger than at any time since the 1930s (Economist, 1994). Disparities have been increasing within the post-industrial countries (especially within the large and prosperous 'world cities') as well as between them and the Third-World countries. The ratio of income level between the poorest and the richest 20 per cent of world population was 30:1 in 1960 and 59:1 in 1990 (UN, 1992).

These five characteristics of post-industrial societies are strongly related to the number of international immigrants and to the processes of their integration (or non-integration) in the receiving societies, as explained below.

MASS MIGRATION TO POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES?

The number of immigrants is growing worldwide. In the period from 1945–70, 100 million immigrants moved from country to country – an average of four million a year; by 1990, the number reached 120 million – an average of six million a year (World Media, 1991). Teitelbaum and Russell (1994) collected data from around the world and came to the conclusion that in the early 1990s at least 100 million immigrants were living outside their countries of birth or citizenship (including both permanent and temporary immigrants as well as refugees). About half of these immigrated to the developed countries of the world (approximately 23 million to Europe, 20 million to North America, and 4 million to Oceania). The present study focuses on this half.

The increasing number of immigrants to the developed countries is related first and foremost to the widening gap in the rates of unemployment and underemployment, as well as in the standards of living between the countries of the North and those of the South and (to a lesser extent) between countries of the West and East. However, had it not been for the declining work force in the rich countries, due to the above-mentioned demographic trends, and were it not for the need of these countries to recruit large numbers of workers, the new laborers would not have come (Alonso, 1987).
The restructuring of the economy of the post-industrial countries is creating a large demand for highly skilled workers, especially those trained in the natural sciences, computers, engineering and medicine. Young people in Western countries, however, prefer to attend schools of business, management and law; as a result, there are many openings in certain high-skill occupations. At the same time, and especially in order to cope with the tough competition in the international markets, there is a demand for unskilled, low-paid workers, to take the jobs that local residents spurned. This increased demand encourages immigration to the developed countries, both of university graduates, who find it difficult to land an appropriate job in their less developed countries, and of unskilled young men and women, who have only a scarce chance of making a living in the overpopulated countries of their birth.

Most of these trends are common to all of the developed countries, but there are also remarkable differences between North America and Europe. While the US and Canada have always been large importers of immigrants, Europe was traditionally an exporter. It was not until the twentieth century, and especially following World War II, that Europe became a region of net in-migration. In the last four decades, the area of net immigration in Europe has progressively grown (Oberg, 1993). Waves of immigrants came to Northern and Central Europe in the 1960s and the early 1970s, at first from southern Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, and then from Yugoslavia and Turkey (King, 1993). In the late 1970s, 1980s and the early 1990s, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the European countries which have a positive migration balance, and a much larger share of the new immigrants started to come from the Third-World countries. Most non-European immigrants come from North Africa; the former imperial nations (England, France, Holland) also take in immigrants from their erstwhile colonies of Asia and Africa.

Reliable statistics are scarce, mainly because the definition of foreigners, immigrants and citizens is not exclusive. All in all, the total number of immigrants in Europe is not large. France (1990), for example, had 4.13 million immigrants (with or without French nationality) among its resident population of 53 million (Ogden, 1993); in England and Wales (1981) 3.5 million persons out of 48.5 million residents were born elsewhere (Coleman, 1992); in Italy (1990) there were about 1 million non-European immigrants (permanent and temporary) among 61 million (Barsotti and Lecchini, 1992). Oberg (1993) concludes a West European survey by saying that the present stream of immigrants includes just around one non-European immigrant per 2000 Europeans per year. He
warns his audience, that ‘without immigration and with a continuously low fertility pattern, almost every third inhabitant of West Europe will be over the age of 65 in 2050’, and according to a more ‘pessimistic’ scenario, 44 per cent will belong to this age group (Oberg, 1992).

The numbers in the US, Canada and Australia are different. The US admitted more than 500,000 legal immigrants on a yearly average in the 1980s and is expected to admit around 1 million annually in the 1990s. Canada expects annual levels of immigration to rise to 250,000 in 1993–5. Australia’s immigration was about 100,000 in 1992 (Teitelbaum and Russell, 1994). These are far larger ratios of new immigrants to permanent residents than those of the Old World. Moreover, while in the 1920s around 95 per cent of the immigrants to the US were European in origin, in the 1960s about 50 per cent came from Third-World countries, and in the 1980s the share of Third-World immigrants grew to about 85 per cent of all immigrants to the US (Clark, 1996). Similar changes in the composition of the populations of immigrants have been reported from Canada and Australia.

A common phenomenon in the highly-developed countries of both the New and the Old World is the growing number of illegal immigrants. They tend to take the worst jobs on the market, jobs that native residents refuse to accept. When they cannot find ordinary jobs, they make their living in the growing informal market of the post-industrial societies. As of 1993, there were approximately 3.5 million illegal residents in the US, most of whom came from Latin America (Teitelbaum and Russell, 1994). The numbers (including relative numbers) are smaller in Europe, but the social tensions they create seem to be stronger. In France, for example, there were 300,000 clandestins (illegal immigrants) in the early 1980s; Silverman (quoted by Ogden 1993:114) claimed that ‘the persistent and misleading confusion between “illegals” and “immigrant workers” has never been adequately resolved: not only has “immigrant” been increasingly reduced to “Arab”, but also immigrants have continued to be identified “as a problem, outside the law and outside the nation”.

The receiving countries have all tried to curtail illegal immigration. The US Congress passed the 1986 Immigration Act, with such an aim in mind. Following this Act, about 1.8 million persons filed applications for legalization on the basis of illegal residence in the United States prior to 1982; an additional 1.3 million seasonal workers also applied for legalization. According to Muller (1993), the Act and the following processes of legalization did not succeed in substantially reducing illegal entry. In anticipation of its partial unification on 31 December 1992, the
European Community strongly urged its member countries to tighten up their immigration policies and take special measures to reduce the number of illegal immigrants in so far as possible. In spite of these efforts, it seems that as long as the strong pressure generated by unemployment in the sending countries continues to exist and as long as there is a demand for cheap labor in the formal and informal economies of the receiving societies, even harsh measures will not be able to stop the flow of illegal immigrants.

While most of the workers among the illegal immigrants are low-skilled, the percentage of highly-skilled and very highly-skilled workers among legal immigrants to post-industrial countries is on the rise. According to a UN report (1992:55), the percentage of skilled workers among immigrants from the developing countries to the US was 45 per cent in 1966 and grew to 75 per cent in 1986, while in Canada the comparable figures were 12 per cent and 46 per cent. Both countries have recently changed their immigration regulations in order to admit a larger proportion of entrepreneurs and skilled workers. The brain drain is increasing, not only from the poor countries to the rich ones, but also from European countries to North America. This is another characteristic feature of immigration in the post-industrial era.

Thus, the number of immigrants is growing and their characteristics are changing. However, the data (especially European data) does not support the designation 'mass migration' that has recently been adopted by European books (for example: King, 1993) and conferences (for example: 'Mass Migration in Europe' held in Laxenburg, Austria, in March 1992). As Sture Oberg (1992), a specialist on world population, wrote, what we are witnessing is 'small numbers but large potentials'.

For the time being, only a little more than two per thousand are leaving the former USSR each year, and the same small proportion per year is received in Germany, the main target area in Western Europe for former citizens of the Communist countries (Ibid.). This ratio is expected to grow in the future, but the main population pressures on Western Europe as well as on the developed countries of the New World will not come from Eastern Europe, but rather from the developing countries. Some 38 million extra people join the labor force each year in the countries of the South, in which more than 700 million are already unemployed or underemployed; this means that one billion new jobs must be created or improved by the end of the decade - almost equivalent to the total population of the North (UN, 1992: 54). The fear caused by these facts has turned immigration and integration into one of the most contentious issues of the late twentieth century.
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Does immigration bring about economic gains or losses? This question should be discussed both from the individual point of view of the immigrant and his/her immediate family, and from the national points of view of the sending as well as the receiving societies.

The common cause of international migration is the desire of the immigrants to improve their economic status. In the past, most of them succeeded in attaining this goal ultimately, if not immediately (i.e. inter-generational mobility). Will this trend continue in the post-industrial society? The answer may differ according to the assets brought by the immigrant, especially education and professional training. As mentioned above, there has been a large percentage of skilled and highly-skilled persons in the immigrating labor force in recent years; physicians and para-medics, engineers and technicians, trained managers and other professionals may still find open channels of economic mobility. For unskilled and poor immigrants the prospects are gloomier by far. If the poor immigrants are ready to take low-wage, long-hours, dead-end jobs, there are enough such jobs available in the present economy, and it seems that there will be many jobs of this kind in years to come. The shortage of jobs in post-industrial societies is at the intermediate level, the level that should be available to the children of the immigrants. Gans (1996) has developed the theory of ‘second generation decline’: it is anticipated that children of immigrants, raised under the cultural aspirations and work expectations of the receiving society, will refuse to take typical ‘immigrant jobs’; this unwillingness, coupled with the scarcity of secure jobs in the primary labor market, is expected to make many of them – particularly young males – join the hard core of the unemployed, and consequently live on welfare, at the least, if they don’t become involved with drugs and crime as well. Thus, faith in the nearly automatic straight-line advancement of immigrants, so common in American and other immigrant pools, is being shattered.

Gender is a salient issue in the context of economic adaptation of immigrants. Women make up nearly half of the international migrant population. In the European OECD countries, women constitute the larger part of foreign-born populations. Although women are often thought of as ‘passive movers’, who migrate to join family members, research has found that economic rather than personal or social considerations predominate. Despite strong evidence of women’s occupation in the labor market, immigration policies still tend to assume that all migrants are men and that women are ‘dependents’. Women’s right to work may be severely
restricted, access to support systems and social services may be limited, and rights to naturalization may be indirect and dependent on the status of the spouse. The level of expectation of immigrant women, like that of immigrant men, tends to be high, their prospects of finding some kind of job and bringing home some money are fairly good, but the road to progress is frequently blocked for them. Social networks, strong bonds of kinship and the extension of traditional social structures to the new settings, coupled with the special restrictions applied to married women immigrants in many countries and the general discrimination against women in the labor markets of the developed countries – combine to reduce the chances of success for women. Thus, unlike the situation for men, the before-after migration balance is showing just a slight (if any) improvement for women (UNFPA, 1993).

Consideration of macroeconomics in place of the micro-view of the individual immigrant leads the discussion into different directions. From ancient days, emigration has helped to reduce the number of persons who have to be fed in regions with limited resources. From this narrow point of view, emigration still assists poor countries. Now, however, the sending countries often lose skilled personnel and the problem of ‘brain drain’ may be severe. On the positive side though, wherever skilled immigrants keep in touch with their country of origin, cultural links are created which encourage much-needed technology transfers. In addition, they sometimes play a major role as investors in what they often continue to consider their homeland, even if a long time has passed since their forebears left it. Technology transfers and investments by ethnic Chinese citizens of the US and Canada, and even more frequently citizens of Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and others) have played a leading role in the recent rapid economic growth of the People’s Republic of China (Financial Times, 1992).

Remittances – the hard currency earnings that immigrants send to family members and others in the country they left – compensate at least in part for the loss of a trained labor force. In 1990 alone, the official total was US$71 billion; the net transfer to the developing countries equaled US$31 billion (Teitelbaum and Russell, 1994). In Jordan, Pakistan and Sudan remittances were equivalent to more than 20 per cent of imports for that year; in Egypt, they were the most significant source of foreign currency income in the 1980s (UN, 1992). Individual households clearly benefit from money received from abroad. Less clear is the impact on the country as a whole. There has been criticism that most of these funds do not go into productive investment, but are used for speculative activities or to finance conspicuous consumption and import of luxury goods. But most expendi-
tured can add to demand and stimulate the local economy. A study conducted in Egypt suggested a coefficient of 2.2 for remittances—that is, remittances of 1 million Egyptian pounds increased the GNP by 2.2 million pounds; a similar study in Pakistan found a multiplier of 2.4 (Ibid.).

In spite of this stream of cash to the sending states, the receiving countries are the main economic beneficiaries. For example: the US Congressional Research Service estimated that in 1981–2 the developing countries as a whole lost an investment of $20,000 for each skilled migrant—$646 million in total. Some of this returns as remittances, but not on a scale sufficient to compensate for the losses (UN, 1992). Other economic benefits to the receiving societies take the form of revenues generated at all levels of government. Opponents of immigration frequently claim that the immigrants do not raise enough taxes to pay for the many services they use—social security benefits, health services and so on. Detailed studies in several countries have provided evidence to the contrary. Akbari (1989) studied the Canadian case and found that immigrants paid (slightly) more taxes than they received in transfer payments. Steinmann (1992) compared the contributed and received revenues of citizens and foreigners in Germany; he reported that the foreigners paid slightly more (taxes, health insurance, etc.) and received far less in transfer payments (mainly because of pensions received by citizens). A recent American study (Moreno-Evans, 1992, reported by Clark, 1993) shows that the Federal government of the US benefits directly from immigration because of the revenues collected from immigrants, but that local districts bear a disproportionately high cost for serving immigrants who arrive as a result of federal policies, laws and decisions. At issue are the disparities in geographic distribution, which create a heavy burden on regions and municipalities with large and often poor immigrant populations.

The dilemma stems from the tendency of immigrants to congregate in particular locations, especially in or near the large metropolitan centers of Western countries. In the 1980s and 1990s, ten metropolitan areas in the US, which housed 17 per cent of the nation’s population attracted 55 per cent of its legal immigrants and probably a larger percentage of the illegal ones; first among them were Los Angeles and New York (Enchautegui, 1993). Figures from the 1980s show concentrations of ‘foreign population’ in certain large European cities: Luxembourg – 43 per cent; Geneva – 29 per cent; Frankfurt, Antwerp, Brussels and Amsterdam – 21–24 per cent (White, 1993). Voices in favor of closing the gates for additional immigrants are frequently heard in these large cities of mixed population.

In the highly-mixed regions, immigrants are frequently blamed for displacing veteran citizens in work places and for a potential decline in wages
due to the excess labor force. Research does not support such claims. Studies by Simon (1989) and Borjas (1990) found that the American labor market was sufficiently segmented to escape noticeable influence by immigrant workers; both rejected the hypothesis that immigration caused unemployment in the US. Their studies were criticized for using aggregated data, but a desegregated analysis of the local areas that are large recipients of immigrants pointed in the same direction. Enchautegui (1993) made an ethnic-specific analysis of such local areas and showed that the wages of Anglo and Hispanic men increased in areas of high immigration; Blacks did not lose, but they did not gain, either.

The general conclusion is clear: the receiving countries and their citizens enjoy great economic gains which result from international migration. There is clear evidence of the financial gains, and also various indications of the contribution of immigrants to the economic vitality and the competitiveness of the highly developed countries. According to Sassen (1994), an expert on cities in the world economy, immigrants have contributed an enormous amount of energy to small-scale, low-profit entrepreneurship, which is necessary to meet the demand for goods and services that larger standardized firms can no longer handle, given the low profit levels and the increased costs of operation. One can see this in Paris, Tokyo, Toronto and Frankfurt, as well as in New York. In this context, she says, immigrants are almost akin to a rapid development force.

Yet, immigrants were not and are not welcome. The main reasons for this are to be found in non-economic spheres.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Veteran residents usually see and treat newcomers as intruders. The German writer and essayist Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1992) illustrates this by a story of two passengers in a railway compartment, who have made themselves at home for a long journey, their clothes hung up, their luggage stowed and the remaining empty seats next to them covered with their newspapers and bags. Suddenly, the door opens and two new passengers enter. Their arrival is not welcome. There is a feeling of reluctance when it comes to clearing the vacant seats to make room for the new arrivals. There is an air of solidarity between the first two passengers, even though they are not acquainted. They confront the newcomers as a group; it is their territory which is at stake. They behave as if they were natives who are laying claim to the entire space for themselves. Any new arrival is treated as an intruder. Enzensberger’s conclusion is that group egoism and
xenophobia are anthropological constants, preceding reason. The fact that these traits are universally present indicates that they are older than most known forms of social order. *Prima facie*, it means that immigration always causes a conflict.

The way to reduce the conflict is to facilitate rapid integration of the immigrants into the receiving society. However, for many — probably a majority — of the immigrants counted above, the concept of integration may be irrelevant. If integration is the process by which a person adapts himself to permanent settlement in a new environment, then it is irrelevant for most of the temporary migrant workers, for the asylum seekers, and for the numerous illegal migrants, many of whom are in constant mobility.

Even if our discussion is confined to long-term immigrants, researchers and policy-makers differ with regard to the desirable form and level of their integration. Through years of study and public debate, three models of integration emerged: assimilation, melting pot and cultural pluralism. Different versions of these models can be identified in different times and countries, but the three can be described in general terms as follows.

Assimilation is a process by which immigrants adopt the cultural norms and lifestyles of the host society in a way that ultimately leads to the disappearance of the newcomers as a separate group. In this model, contact between the minority group of immigrants and the dominant culture results in a gradual process of change in the minority group (and not in the receiving society), and its members gradually abandon their culture of origin in order to adapt themselves to the host society. This process has frequently been described in terms of conformity and/or acculturation. The numerical weight of the members of the dominant society, the frequency and intensity of the contacts and the passage of time were all considered assimilation-accelerating factors (Taft, 1963, 1985). The model was formulated by Robert Park (1928, 1950), the founder of the School of Sociology at the University of Chicago. He and his leading students, including Louis Wirth and Franklin Fraizer, assumed that assimilation was not only natural and inevitable, but would be all for the best (Glazer, 1993). Later researchers (Lieberson, 1961; Gordon, 1964; Barth and Noel, 1972) made the model more complex and more sophisticated, but generally agreed with respect to assimilation as the final result.

Social reality did not support the idea of inevitable assimilation. Empirical evidence, together with the unpopularity of assimilative ideas paved the way to the concept of the melting pot. The term had been known for decades: America was the great melting pot in which all the races of Europe were melted down and reshaped. But it was not until the 1940s that American researchers started to use it frequently as the title of a new
model of integration, a model which allows two-way cultural influences. The final result is still a society which is culturally and ethnically homogeneous (allows for religious heterogeneity) (Herberg, 1955), but the construction of this new society is based on the interaction of all the existing cultures. The different ethnic groups of immigrants are not considered – as they were in the assimilation model – passive objects, but rather active subjects, who participate in the formation of the new nation (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963).

The ideal of a melting pot that included, in addition to a cultural mix, the creation of a new nation through biological interbreeding, seemed to work for most of the European groups in the US, but has never materialized for the Blacks, the largest minority group, with the deepest roots in America (with the exception of native American Indians). The Afro-Americans continued to suffer from segregation, discrimination and blocked social mobility. Many consider their suffering as proof of the failure of both the assimilation and the melting pot ideals.

Meanwhile, new ideas about coexistence of different ethnic groups were taking shape, with UNESCO leading its international dissemination. 'Union in Diversity' was the leading slogan of the Havana international conference in 1956 (Borrie, 1959), calling for cultural differentiation within a framework of social unity. Gradually, the model of cultural pluralism has taken center stage. It allows heterogeneity not as a transitory state, but rather as a permanent phenomenon in society. It assumes that the different groups of society influence each other reciprocally, that together they create the national space in which all participants are citizens with equal rights and with which all of them identify. The goal of the integration process was redefined as promoting civic unity while protecting ethnic diversity (Fuchs, 1993).

All three models take a macro viewpoint of the receiving society. They ignore the possibility that the process of immigrant integration can take different forms in different parts of the society (geographically and socially) or where it relates to different types of immigrants. They also ignore the wishes of the immigrants themselves as determinants of their integration or non-integration. The present behavior of immigrants in various developed countries indicates that disregarding their motivation is a mistake. It is especially so when immigrants of the same origin constitute a group in a particular locality which is large enough for their motivations to play a decisive role in the processes discussed.

Even though Glazer (1993) believes that the forces pressing towards assimilation have not lost power in American society, he admits that they have never worked for the Blacks. As for the Hispanics and Asian-
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Americans, who seem to have been better accepted by the white majority, he found that they chose to establish or preserve an institutional base for a separate identity. The same tendency of preserving a separate identity, not only by means of religious and cultural institutions but also—at least to some extent—by having ethnic-based sources of livelihood (ethnic businesses) and political institutions, is reported by studies of Mexicans in Los Angeles, of Chinese immigrants in Vancouver and of Turks in Hamburg. It might have been encouraged by prejudice and discrimination derived from the majority population; but it seems to stem mainly from the free will of the immigrants and their ability to openly express this will in societies that have legitimized diversity of all kinds.

Diversification is the name of the game. It used to be an either/or situation: either you stay in your country of origin or you immigrate and integrate, that is, settle permanently and take upon you the identity of another nation. In the post-industrial era we are witnessing a multiple-alternative situation; the two main alternatives are temporary vs permanent migration, and within each of these there is a diversity of immigrants. Within the category of permanent international immigration, even within the same country, there is more than one pattern of integration; different groups of immigrants can make their choices between assimilation or the preservation of specific parts of their original culture, and even their original institutions. Within the temporary category, there are several common ways: a migrant may be part of the legal economy by having one of the permits for highly qualified personnel in the corporate sector (see the presentation of The Euroman in World Media, 1992), or by having a work permit for unskilled work in agriculture, construction and so on; another way of joining the sector of temporary migrants is to find a living in the growing shadow economy (the informal economy) of the developed countries. The lifestyles of people in these different immigrant groups vary greatly one from the other. Last, but not least, the world now has a new type of immigrant: people who have homes, careers and cultural roots in more than one society (see the report of the Puerto Ricans as multiple movers by Scheff and Hernandez, 1993). Where does this variety take us? The following discussion will cover this question.

CONCLUSION

Global orientation and diversification have been discussed in this chapter as megatrends of the post-industrial era. For conclusion, two hypotheses are suggested: the first is that the influence of these two megatrends will grow
immensely, not only on the economy, but also on the direction and content of social and political changes in the twenty-first century; the second is that international immigrants will serve as major carriers of these changes.

It seems that the greatest cultural transformation of our civilization is that we now look to the future rather than the past. Traditional societies were based on the past; each generation was expected to add just a drop to the accumulation of human knowledge, and thus, the complete transfer of knowledge from one generation to the next was considered to be of the utmost importance. In our world, in the context of very rapid development of science and technology, a considerable part of human knowledge is created within the lifetime of each generation (25 years). People are born into a rapidly changing world and they expect it to continue changing even more rapidly. Therefore, attention moves from studying the past and organizing life by the experience of the past to attempts at adaptation to the uncertain future.

Migration implies leaving the past and present and concentrating on the future. Researchers used to believe that potential immigrants compare job openings, wages and standards of living in their home countries with those in their target areas, and make their decisions accordingly. But if this is the case, how can we explain the continued immigration to the huge cities of the developing countries that cannot provide reasonable standards of living for many, if not most, of their residents? And how can we explain the movements to cities of the developed world in which most immigrants experience a sharp decline in their socioeconomic status? The answer is that migration decisions are based on hopes and expectations for the future, rather than on considerations of the present. In this sense, immigrants are indubitably representatives of the post-industrial period, the era of the future.

But has this not been true of immigrants in the past? Is there something unique about the immigrants of the new era? At least three trends are worth mentioning here. One is that the search for new opportunities is frequently made on a global scale, and this becomes true for non-skilled workers almost as much as for highly-skilled immigrants. The second is that the legitimation of cultural diversity may encourage immigrants to maintain their separate identities in their new homes, and in consequence, gradually alter the nature of the existing nations. The third is the changing concept of rights: in the past, immigrants were either potential citizens, who could expect to receive full citizenship rights, or foreigners who came to work for a limited period of time and had very few rights; today immigrants enjoy many rights by virtue of their mere presence in a country: welfare, education for their children, instruction in their own language, and appeal against deportation. Rights are increasingly defined in universal terms; 'voting rights are human rights', claimed the 1990 migrants' voting rights cam-
campaign in Austria (Soyal, 1995). If trends continue to develop in the same direction and if the large potential of mass migration movements is realized, the outcome will be a new social and political order.

This chapter is devoted to the understanding of processes and does not deal directly with ways to ease the social turbulence caused by immigration, but let me note here that governments can — and to the best of my judgment — should play a major role in treating the issues discussed above. In spite of the rhetoric in favor of privatization and a reduction of the public sector, governments in the developed countries are highly involved in all spheres: service production (education, health, housing and welfare), guiding economic development (extensively, whether directly or indirectly), determining the standard of living of their citizens (through taxation and many other ways), and even shaping public and personal attitudes (appropriate nutrition and environmental conservation are two examples). These involved governments have no choice but to relate to issues of immigration: the number of immigrants, immigrant rights, and the dilemmas of integration and the appropriate governmental role in shaping it.

Other chapters in this book deal with these policy questions. This chapter ends with a theoretical question bearing on policy challenges: will the present economic globalization be followed by immigration-driven social globalization in the post-industrial societies? Following World War II, a hundred or so new nations were established which strengthened the semi-stable structure of a world composed of nation-states. Almost all of the human population was sorted and organized, not always neatly, according to principles of territoriality and citizenship. Will this structure give way to a more fluid one, in which national identities are blurred by affiliations transcending nationality? Will mass immigration movements, and the processes of intra-national diversification they cause, create a more flexible global structure, composed of communities of different size and various degrees of control over their members? Will the inhabitants of this new world move freely among its communities and, instead of clinging to their citizenship rights, carry with them wherever they go their extended human rights? These questions are left open.

References


