Three generations of urban renewal policies: analysis and policy implications

Naomi Carmon *

Faculty of Architecture and Town Planning, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel

Abstract
This paper, based on 20 years of research and teaching related to urban renewal policies and programs, analyzes the history of planned intervention for the regeneration of distressed residential areas. It divides it into three “generations”, each with unique policy components, related to the social, economic and political characteristics of its period in history, with different major players, methods of action and outcomes. All three generations can be identified in the US, the UK and several other European countries, although not always precisely in the same form and at the same time. Analysis of three case studies in Israeli neighborhoods is used in this paper to point at typical results and the main lessons that can be taken from each of the three generations. Finally, a set of proposed policies, based on lessons learned from the preceding generations and projects, is presented. This set is likely to achieve better results with respect to both people (the residents) and places (the neighborhoods) than those obtained from earlier efforts at regeneration.

1. Introduction
The goals of this paper are to analyze policies of intervention in deteriorated urban areas, learn from past experience and propose a set of improved regeneration principles of action. The paper is composed of three parts. The first is a condensed historical analysis of planned – mainly public – intervention in distressed residential areas, primarily in the United States and the United Kingdom, but also in European countries and Israel (the author’s country). The analysis introduces three generations of policies, and includes a description of the initiatives with their socioeconomic background, a recapitulation of activities and actors, and evaluations of the outcomes. The second part presents Israeli case studies of three neighborhoods, representing the three generations of neighborhood remedies and their lessons. The third, which is policy oriented, proposes strategic and tactical principles for a new generation of urban regeneration policies and programs.

2. Historical overview
Most of the published literature presents the history of planned intervention in urban areas in each country separately. In this paper, the emphasis is on our shared experience, especially as it evolved in Great Britain and the United States, and in Israel that followed them, with some reference to other Western countries. The similarities we find are partly attributed to international policy transfer, but to a larger extent, are related to similarities in the socioeconomic and sociopolitical developments in Western countries, particularly after World War II.

The historical overview is divided into generations of policies. The term generations is appropriate in this context, because it expresses reference to periods of time, each with its unique social, economic and political characteristics and with different main actors, who create different policies. The claim is that a typical approach to issues of regeneration can be identified for each generation. This does not mean, however, that the typical approach was the only one at the time; we know of overlaps between generations and also within generations. But the suggested classification seems to be fruitful in terms of understanding policy changes, analyzing their outcomes and learning their lessons.

2.1. First Generation: the era of the bulldozer – physical determinism and emphasis on the built environment

Intolerable housing conditions in old and very old buildings in the growing cities, coupled with the wish to
make “better use” of central urban land and drive the poor out of sight, gave birth to the idea of slum clearance. In the United Kingdom, the process started on a massive scale with the Greenwood Act of 1930 (Short, 1982). In the United States, there is disagreement over whether to attribute the starting point to the Housing Law of 1937, or as many propose, to assign it to the legislation of 1949, which was the first to recognize public responsibility for the settlement of all families in the United States in “decent and affordable housing”.

Over a quarter of a million housing units were demolished or sealed up and more than one and a quarter million people were rehoused in the UK of the 1930s (Gibson and Langstaff, 1982). The momentum was halted by the Second World War, to be renewed only with the Housing Law of 1954. The objective established by the planners at that time was to raze 12–60,000 units a year and build 100–150,000 new units (Short, 1982). Most of the units demolished were low-rise private construction, while most of the new flats were in big blocks of public housing.

The public authorities in the UK managed both the clearance and the provision of housing for those relocated in new council housing. In the US, by contrast, concentration and clearance of land sites was generally done by public agencies, while the new construction was in the hands of private entrepreneurs. As a result, the number of apartments demolished under the aegis of the Urban Renewal programs in the US was much greater than the number of units built. The slum areas were frequently replaced by shopping centers, office buildings, and cultural and entertainment centers, all of which were in high demand in the booming years that followed World War II. The few housing developments built were generally designated for people with higher socioeconomic status than those who were relocated (Greer, 1965). Gans (1967, p. 468) testified that between the years 1949 and 1964 only one half of one percent of all expenditures by the American federal government for urban renewal was spent on relocation of the families and individuals removed from their homes.

Despite the significant differences in the nature of activity in the two countries, the criticism voiced against most of the projects in the US and UK was similar (Wilmott and Young, 1957; Gans, 1962; Fried, 1966; Hartman, 1971; Parker, 1973; English et. al., 1976). The executors were criticized for ignoring the heavy psychological cost of enforced relocation and the social cost of the destruction of healthy communities. In those cases where new residential neighborhoods were built, the planners and designers were blamed for building inhuman multistory blocks which were unfit for family life, and certainly not suitable for poor families. Moreover, in many places the redevelopment projects continued for 2–3 decades, and for much of that time, unused buildings and vacant lots covered the center of the city, causing vast economic and social damage.

Similar criticism of the construction of roads and commercial buildings in place of housing was heard in Canada as well, where the urban renewal plan included 48 projects between 1948 and 1968 (Carter, 1991). In France, criticism was directed at the “removal followed by modernization” approach, which guided the urban renewal activities in the years 1958–1975 (Primus and Metselaar, 1992).

Indeed, in many of the Western world’s large cities, and especially in the United States, luxurious projects of concrete, steel and glass were built on the sites of slums razed by the bulldozers. Some of these projects, such as Lincoln Center in New York, fulfill important urban functions (Sanders, 1980). But in many of the reported cases, the long-term economic and social costs of the displacement and demolition policies and of the concentration of poor people in large residential blocks were much too high. This applies also to the Israeli case analyzed below. Thus, the bulldozer approach as a leading regeneration strategy was condemned and disqualified in most of the places it was applied.

2.2. Second Generation: neighborhood rehabilitation – a comprehensive approach emphasizing social problems

In the US of the 1960s and later on in other countries, a new approach to assisting distressed neighborhoods was developed and implemented. It was influenced by the severe criticism of the bulldozer approach of the First Generation. At its background were the general economic growth and the upward mobility of large segments of society, followed by the “rediscovery of poverty” within the “society of plenty” (Harrington, 1962; Cullingworth, 1973). Public opinion became more favorable than before towards public programs which require large allocations for welfare purposes. As a consequence, it was possible to plan and implement comprehensive rehabilitation programs, aimed at improving existing housing and environments (instead of demolishing them), while simultaneously, treating the social problems of the population by adding social services and bettering their quality. Many of the new programs tried to involve local residents in their decision making processes and made “maximum feasible participation” a leading slogan of the period.

The “Great Society” programs of the American President, Lyndon Johnson, with the “War on Poverty” at their heart, did not succeed in preventing the riots which broke out in the mid-1960s in the large cities of the US. The response of the administration was the Model Cities program (Haar, 1975). This program, which was funded by the Federal Government (80%) and the local authorities (20%), established a comprehensive approach to the problems of poverty in the
distressed areas of large cities. In the course of seven years, 2.3 billion dollars were spent on target neighborhoods, under the management of the newly created Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (Frieden and Kaplan, 1975). Most of this sum was allotted to social projects in the fields of education, health, professional training, public safety, etc., and only a small fraction of the sum was spent on housing rehabilitation (Listokin, 1983) and on infrastructure.

Despite the abundance of good will and the large sums expended, the program was generally considered a failure. There are those who maintain that what prevented its success was the expansion of the framework from a model program of 36 neighborhoods to 66 and, later on, to double the number of neighborhoods, almost without additional resources (Banfield, 1974). Others believe that the program, like other War on Poverty programs of that time, was “too theoretical” and that it was overwhelmed by the multiplicity of its own regulations and constraints (Moynihan, 1969). Wood (1990), who served as chairman of the task force which created the program, claims that it had partial successes and some positive long-term consequences (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986), but Frieden and Kaplan (1975, p. 234) conclude by saying that the “gap between promise and performance was conspicuously large”.

In the UK, similar socioeconomic forces were active during the 1960s and 1970s, creating similar although not identical responses in the area of urban regeneration. In the physical domain, the salient trend was a rapid transition from clearance to renovation of existing buildings and environments (Murrie, 1990); it took place under the slogan “old houses into new homes”. The social programs were influenced by ideas developed by American planners, such as participation of residents in community development and positive discrimination. In 1975, there were 3750 projects related to the war on poverty, with a combined budget that reached 34 million pounds. Various ministries of the British government and local authorities took part, dealing with matters of education, employment and welfare, partly within the framework of the Urban Programme (Gibson and Langstaff, 1982, Ch. 5). Most of the programs were local and of limited scale. Many were conducted in areas where the GIA (General Improvement Areas), the main governmental program for physical improvement of housing and environment in distressed areas, was active. It so happened in this period of time that programs for physical renovation of housing were implemented in these areas simultaneously with programs for handling social problems, a rare combination in Britain, where physical and social programs were usually separated, organizationally and spatially.

As Alterman (1991) has shown, many of the upgrading programs in the European countries were unisectoral and focused solely or primarily on physical renovation of housing and infrastructure. So it was in Sweden, Holland and West Germany (with a few rare exceptions such as those described by Schmoll (1991)). But in other countries, including Canada, France and Israel, the comprehensive model of the United States was applied. Canada’s Neighborhood Improvement Program received Parliamentary approval in 1973 and included 322 local authorities; it dealt with the renovation of existing housing, together with selective demolition of unsound housing, and allotted funds for social and community services, while insuring the participation of the residents in the decision-making process (Lyon and Newman, 1986; Carter, 1991). The French policy of Neighborhood Social Development, announced in 1981, reached 150 neighborhoods throughout France and was directed toward comprehensive and integrated management of housing, education, social integration, employment, professional training, health, culture and leisure, with emphasis on participation of the residents in the processes of change (Tricart, 1991).

2.3. Third Generation: revitalization, especially in city centers – a business-like approach emphasizing economic development

In the beginning of the 1970s, an economic slowdown was spreading worldwide. At the same time, the governments and public of several Western countries were unfavorably impressed by the results of research which was unable to indicate significant positive results for many of the large social programs of the 1960s. One of the famous examples of such a research is the work of Gibson and Prathes (1977), which surveyed many evaluations of social programs and reached the conclusion that “nothing works”; another is Charles Murray’s conclusion that the only thing the War on Poverty programs managed to produce was more poor people (Murray, 1984). Right-wing governments canceled Second-Generation type programs, and only slight public attention was paid to the worsening urban problems, especially in the inner cities.

In those years of the 1970s and 1980s, interesting spontaneous processes of revitalization were documented in large cities of the developed countries. The very low prices of land and housing in the city centers began to attract both small and large private entrepreneurs. The new processes can be divided into two groups: public–individual partnerships (my term) and public–private partnerships (a term widely used in the professional literature). The first term refers to cases in which investments by individual people, households and owners of small businesses in deteriorated neighborhoods are supplemented directly (mainly in the form of subsidized loans) or indirectly (special regulations, investments in the surrounding public services, etc.) by the authorities. The second term describes the cooperation
which has become common in recent years between large private investors, often corporations, and public authorities, generally the local government.

I propose sorting the public–individual partnerships into the following three classes:

- **Gentrification.** This process tends to occur in the vicinity of vibrant CBDs of cities, where a stock of housing with some kind of “charm” – architectural and/or historical – is available. In most cases it is the first sign of revitalization, but in several places it followed other investments in the area. Researchers have extensively described this process, whose key players are oftentimes young people with higher education levels, Yuppies (young urban professionals) and Dinks (double income, no kids). They invest their savings or take loans in order to renovate old buildings in deteriorated central neighborhoods in the United States (Lipton, 1977, Gale, 1984, 1990), Canada (Ley, 1981, 1992) and West European countries (Smith and Williams, 1986; van Weesep and Musterd, 1991). Gentrification and its consequences have attracted research attention and criticism (Griffith, 1996). The most hotly debated effect is displacement, i.e., the finding that the entry of the middle class frequently pushes out incumbent lower-class populations (Hartman, 1979; Schill and Nathan, 1983; Marcuse, 1986; Smith, 1996). In spite of the controversy, local authorities tend to encourage the “back to the city” movement of members of the middle class (Laska and Spain, 1980; Spain, 1992; Kaufman and Carmon, 1992), through convenient regulations, tax discounts, subsidized loans and improvements to roads and other services, in neighborhoods where the process has begun. Recently, researchers have argued that “the extent and impacts of gentrification have been exaggerated in the urban literature of the 1970s and 1980s, and that the process itself will be of decreasing importance as we move beyond the recession of the early 1990s” (Bourne, 1993, p. 183).

- **Upgrading by incumbent (veteran) residents.** Clay (1979) was the first to name this regeneration process; he described groups of local residents who had decided to invest their own efforts toward improving their housing and environment, and sometimes succeeded in persuading others to assist them. In the US, they usually applied to the local authorities and to not-for-profit organizations; in the UK, often to building societies (Murrie, 1990). While gentrification occurs in proximity to city centers, upgrading by incumbent residents is common in less central neighborhoods. Much of the American CDCs activity may be included in this category (several cases are described in Keating et al., 1996), as well as some of what Nathan (1992) has recently named “zones of emergence”.

- **Upgrading by immigrants.** In the past, the appearance of poor immigrants in a neighborhood was considered to be a major cause of deterioration. In contrast, in recent years (in the US, since the 1965 change in the immigration law), there has been a strong flow of different immigrants to the developed countries. These immigrants often come from large cities of the less developed countries; many of them are skilled workers, they frequently have high educational levels and other resources, and they aim to penetrate the middle class in the countries of their destination. The flow of low-class immigrants has not stopped, but the rates of skilled immigrants have risen immensely (Carmon, 1996a). Winnick (1990) found that the “new immigrants” breathed life into deteriorated neighborhoods in New York; they increased employment and the number of businesses in the area, renovated apartments and buildings and filled the schools. Muller (1993) found a few concentrations of urban regeneration in the cities of New York, Los Angeles and Miami, which receive many immigrants. Nathan (1992) in the US and Bourne (1993) in Canada are pointing at the immigrants as a rising force of contributors to urban revitalization. The wave of immigration to Israel from the former Soviet Union, characterized by a large highly educated work force, spurred hopes for processes of revitalization in distressed neighborhoods of cities in Israel (Carmon, 1998).

The other prominent group in the Third Generation is that of public–private partnerships in economic development projects. These projects are almost always concentrated in the heart of the city and include giant shopping malls, convention centers, hotels and occasionally prestige housing. Well-known examples in the United States include the Quincy Market in Boston, Pike Place in Seattle and Horton Plaza in San Diego, the development of which was documented by Frieden and Sagalin (1989). More recent projects in the US were analyzed by Fainstein (1994), Robertson (1995) and Wagner et al. (1995). The best known British example is London Docklands (Church, 1988; Stoker, 1989; Brownhill, 1990; Brian, 1992), but there are many other “flagship developments” in Britain (Middleton, 1991; Healey et al., 1992; Smyth, 1994). Many of these large projects have been commercially successful. They attract business, local customers and tourists, make a significant addition to the local tax base and enhance the city’s prestige. The public–private deal-making which made them possible has transformed the nature of city development practice. It has frequently raised troublesome issues of conflict of interests and accountability, but the participants and the public have tended to ignore them (Sagalyn, 1990).

Researchers who investigated the distribution of benefits from urban economic developments of this Third Generation type have agreed that they contributed to widening the gap between the “haves” and the
have nots’. This conclusion was reported from Hamburg (Danschat and Ossenbruegge, 1990), London and New York (Fainstein, 1994), and from other cities (Stoker, 1989; Keating and Krumholz, 1991). The “trickle down” theory, according to which benefits from rapid economic development filter down to all levels of society, has not stood the test. Instead, “divided cities” and “cities of conflict” grew up in the 1980s and 1990s (Marcuse, 1993), in which “islands of renewal” are surrounded by “seas of decay” (Berry, 1985).

3. Three generations of neighborhood regeneration in Israel: empirical evidence and its lessons

The State of Israel was established in 1948. It started as an undeveloped society and economy, but has changed considerably, very rapidly in the first 25 years and gradually since then. The state (within the official boarders of the Israeli law which have never included the West Bank and Gaza) has reached its 50th birthday with 6 million citizens (82% Jewish and most of the others – Arabs) and a GNP per capita approaching the one of Great Britain.

Urban planning in Israel has been highly influenced by developments abroad, especially in Great Britain, since the days of the British Mandate on Palestine, and in the US, where many Israeli planners had some part of their professional training. This is particularly true with regard to neighborhood regeneration efforts, as is evident by the following description.

In the first 10 years of the State of Israel, almost nobody cared about older urban areas. Leaders, planners and laymen were too busy with constructing new towns, new neighborhoods and new villages. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, urban protesters started raising their voice and scholars presented findings that supported their demands for improvements. The then Minister of Housing visited the US and was highly impressed by what was presented to him as the great success of Urban Renewal. When he returned home, he initiated the establishment of the governmental Authority for Redevelopment and Demolition of Slum Areas, which had a commitment to demolition, as in the US, but also to relocation of the tenants whose homes were taken, as in the UK (Almogi, 1963; Alexander, 1988). The stated goal was to “solve once and for ever the problem of slums”. The innocent beliefs were that a radical improvement of the housing conditions will open the way to improvements in all the other areas, and that the costs of the Demolition and Redevelopment projects to the public will be negligible, because most of it will soon be covered by a more efficient use of central city lands. Nothing of the high hopes was materialized, as demonstrated below by the story of Neve Eliezer.

Israel was lucky. Just three demolition projects under the new authority had been approved before popular resentment to residents evacuation and the harsh criticism of the US urban renewal convinced the Israeli decision makers to stop operations a’la First Generation style. Meanwhile, the six days war and the immigration wave that followed it kept the government and the Ministry of Housing busy.

In 1977 a new government came to power in Israel, the first right-wing government ever. Unlike what could have been expected, an important share of the electoral support of the rightist government came from the distressed neighborhoods of the country. Hence, soon after its establishment, the Prime Minister Mr. Begin announced a national program for neighborhoods rehabilitation. Among the first managers of this large-scale governmental program were several graduates of American universities, including persons who had just completed their evaluation studies of Model Cities. They eagerly designed an improved version of this comprehensive program for wide implementation throughout the country. The principles of Israel’s Project Renewal expressed the “spirit” of the Second Generation of renewal policies. Prominent among these were: integrated social and physical rehabilitation of the selected areas; allocation of resources on the basis of the targeted area information, rather than by personal means tests; working with the existing population in the existing environment (i.e., no demolition of buildings, no evacuation of residents or replacement of a weak population with a stronger one); decentralization; and participation of the residents in the planning, financing and implementation of the project (Carmon and Hill, 1988). Between 1978 and 1994 about 130 residential areas with a total population of approximately 800,000 people (out of the 4–5 million citizens of Israel in the 1980s) were included in this nationwide project. It was administered by the central government, in collaboration with the semi public organization of the Jewish Agency, with some power of decision making conferred to local residents, but hardly any to local governments.

Israel’s Project Renewal was extensively documented and researched (see Spiro, 1991, and an annotated bibliography in Hebrew and English by Carmon, 1996b), probably more so than any other program of this type in Western countries. The researchers had clear conclusions as to what had been achieved and what had not (see below, the discussion of IGKM). The generally positive research conclusions were among the factors that supported the continuation of the project. Officially, in 1999, it is still administered by the Ministry of Housing and works in several dozen urban residential areas. No government dared to eliminate a project with such noble goals, but its budgets have been continuously reduced since the middle 1980s, in parallel with adding
distressed areas to its framework. Hence, the actual impact has been considerably diluted.

As in other countries in the developed countries, processes of spontaneous revitalization have been documented in residential urban areas of the large cities of Israel in the 1980s, especially in Tel Aviv. The central government was the main player in the first two generations of urban renewal policies, with planners and citizens taking active roles in the second one. The current Third Generation is pushed ahead by the private sector with a strong support of local governments, mainly municipalities of the large cities, as shown below by the analysis of the Florentine case.

The following three case studies were selected so that each represents the policies, players and outcomes typical of one of the three generations. On the basis of a fairly deep familiarity with what has happened and what has been studied in the field under discussion in several countries, I dare to say that the description and evaluation of these three cases may be used to demonstrate what can and cannot be expected from the different policies of each generation, not only in Israel.

3.1. First Generation: Neveh Eliezer – a neighborhood of relocatees from Kfar Shalem in Tel Aviv

The first large planned project of the Redevelopment and Demolition new authority of the Ministry of Housing (established in 1963) was the clearing and reconstruction of Kfar Shalem in Tel Aviv. Kfar Shalem is situated in southeast Tel Aviv. Its excellent location, fairly close to the CBD of Tel Aviv and right in the middle of the Tel Aviv Metropolitan area, had no positive influence on the socioeconomic and physical condition of the area. The poor residents lived in small, old and mostly dilapidated houses. Sanitary infrastructure and public services were either totally lacking, or highly inadequate. Most of the inhabitants were immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, who had come to Israel in the 1950s. The 1961 census found in the area of Kfar Shalem a population of about 8000 people in some 1600 households (Almogi, 1963). The families were large and frequently suffering from multiplicity of problems. They were poor in knowledge, economic resources and political strength. When they were made to choose between receiving compensation or alternative housing in buildings constructed for them on a vacant site on the edge of Kfar Shalem, most of them preferred to remain in a familiar environment, among people they knew. They moved into the new neighborhood of Neveh Eliezer (Farber, 1979).

Neveh Eliezer was built specifically for the Kfar Shalem relocatees. From the middle 1960s to the middle 1970s, 4-story row houses were built in the new neighborhood, each with 4–8 entrances. Approximately 1000 families, many of them with numerous children, were housed there in apartments of 2–3 small rooms (living rooms are counted as well as bedrooms), totaling 54–65 square meters of floor space. A public company managed the neighborhood housing. All day-to-day services were built in the neighborhood: a day care center, kindergartens, two elementary schools, an infirmary and mother-infant care center, synagogues and a small shopping center. The neighborhood is well connected to various parts of Tel Aviv by means of regular public transportation (Farber, 1979).

On the face of it, an ideal upgrading process was achieved. Not only were the relocatees not thrown into the street, but they were provided with homes and a residential environment which – at least with respect to objective physical data – were better than those in which they had lived before. However, the expectation that upgrading the physical conditions would resolve most of the tough problems of this problem-laden population did not materialize.

About a dozen years after the first residents settled in Neveh Eliezer, the Municipality of Tel Aviv-Yafo had to start a neighborhood project of physical and social rehabilitation. In 1980, Neveh Eliezer was placed on the list of distressed neighborhoods included in Project Renewal, the national rehabilitation program. When the evaluators who accompanied Project Renewal arrived at Neve Eliezer, they found a place and a population in deep troubles. About one quarter of the population was dependent on welfare; a large portion of the young people was poorly educated and unemployed; juvenile delinquency, drug dependence and family violence were frequently reported (Hill and Carmon, 1982). Their analysis raised two main conclusions:

(a) The buildings were not suitable for the population of relocatees. The apartments were very small in comparison with the needs of the generally large families. Indeed, the housing units which had been evacuated were no larger, but they were built on the ground and, in Israel’s climate the yard can be considered part of the house through many months of the year. In addition, residence in large blocks with many families did not suit the life style and the residential culture to which the residents were accustomed. This resulted in frequent fights among neighbors and highly deficient maintenance of the buildings.

(b) Such a high concentration of multi-problem families did not have a chance of developing normally from the outset; Neveh Eliezer neighborhood was a distressed neighborhood from the day it was founded.

In addition to the failure of Neve Eliezer a rehabilitated neighborhood, the evacuation of the bigger area of Kfar Shalem could not be completed, and as a result, only bits and pieces of the large redevelopment project could have been implemented. The evacuation process was fraught with difficulties and very high compensation payments which were not foreseen. Within a short time,
the authorities to reconsider forced evacuation, even when pregnant women and small children from their homes caused the authorities to reconsider forced evacuation, even when the law was on their side. Moreover, buildings which had been evacuated but not immediately demolished were occupied by new families, who also refused to evacuate without high compensation. Hence, the redevelopment project was delayed for several decades.

To date, the evacuation of Kfar Shalem, which began in the early 1960s, has not been completed. The project’s management still hopes to complete most of the development plans by the year 2000 (Frenkel, 1995). This may not sound as exceptionally lagging to those familiar with urban renewal projects in other countries. For many of them it took 25–40 years to be completed, years through which residents, businessmen and municipalities suffered, mainly from the existence of abandoned and/or ruined properties in their environment.

3.2. Second Generation: IGKM – a public housing area in Jerusalem

Among the first neighborhoods of Israel’s Project Renewal was Ir Ganim – Kyriat Menachem (henceforth IGKM), an urban quarter consisted mostly of public housing blocks of the 1960s, situated on the southwest edge of Jerusalem. Towards the end of the 1970s IGKM had approximately 12,000 residents in some 3000 households. The neighborhood was not terribly disturbed and there were middle class families in smaller buildings in its fringe lots, but the problems in the main part of it were serious enough to make it eligible to the governmental rehabilitation project (Yoelson et al., 1980). Small apartments (most of them 50–70 square meters in size), a high level of housing density, dampness and mold in about 40% of the apartments, and an overabundance of neglected yards between buildings and between different areas in the neighborhood, were the salient physical problems. Among the social ones: 10% of the men and 25% of the women were unemployed, 20% of the households were (at least partly) dependent on welfare, achievements of children in school were considered as low, and juvenile delinquency was common. Project Renewal was aimed at improving the housing conditions of the residents and the social services provided for them, and at raising the status of the neighborhood, without replacing its occupants. It was managed by the central government with little involvement of the local authorities.

The project worked in IGKM in a way that was supposed to insure its success. A comprehensive, multianual rehabilitation plan was prepared for the neighborhood. Not only experts were involved in preparing this plan but also local residents. Public participation in decision-making reached quite a high level. General elections were held in the neighborhood to choose its 11 representatives to the local steering committee of Project Renewal, which had another 11 representative of the public bodies (national and municipal) involved in the project. One of the residents served as chairperson of the steering committee and several served as chair people of its subcommittees. Voluntary local organizations of young people were also active in the neighborhood. The organizational structure and an elaborated implementation process were designed to enable effective operation of Project Renewal (Altermann, 1990; Churchman, 1990).

The project ran simultaneously many physical and social programs, aimed at seven of the eight principle problems identified in the preliminary survey of IGKM. There were programs directed at upgrading the housing and physical infrastructure, programs for renovating and equipping social services – kindergartens, youth clubs, a community center, family health clinic, dental clinic, synagogue, etc., and many social programs in the areas of pre-school education (such as improving readiness of toddlers and kindergarten children for school), “enriching” the formal education provided by the schools, as well as the informal education offered in the community centers, adult education, health services, employment service (some), sport and leisure time activities (many), and special programs for women and the elderly (Carmon, 1989).

The percentage of beneficiaries from Project Renewal in IGKM was very high. This was especially so in the area of housing: every household in the neighborhood benefited from at least one of the project’s housing programs. The project accelerated a process of housing privatization that had already reached about half of the households before the project started. The exteriors of all of the buildings in the neighborhood were renovated, with participation of the residents in planning and implementation in about half of the cases. The interiors of 10% of the apartments (mostly those of tenants) were renovated, including special renovations for the elderly. About 20% of the apartments were enlarged with Project Renewal assistance; at least one room was added to each enlarged apartment, and frequently more than one. Most of the people who expanded their apartments were owner-occupiers; actually, the possibility to enlarge one’s home was an incentive to purchase it from the public company. Hence, the enlargement scheme was an interesting form of public–private (actually, public–individual) partnership in planning, financing and implementation (Carmon, 1992).

In the mid-1980s, a comprehensive evaluation of Project Renewal was conducted. During the course of
some three years, data of many kinds were collected for 10 of the 70 neighborhoods in which the project had been active at that time, including IGKM (Carmon and Hill, 1988; Carmon, 1989; Alterman and Churchman, 1991). The research found that Project Renewal succeeded in meeting at least some of its goals. Living conditions in the neighborhood were improved in a number of ways, satisfaction with the neighborhood and the services increased to some extent, and the number of households in the neighborhood stabilized.

The goal not attained was improvement in the status of the neighborhood. Despite the many improvements, the image of the neighborhood in the eyes of its residents and other residents of Jerusalem did not improve. Families of somewhat higher socioeconomic status continued to leave it, especially families with children. Their places were taken by households of young people with low socioeconomic status, although they still had a generally higher level of education and other resources than the veteran residents. Housing prices in IGKM increased, but the relationship between prices of similar apartments in the research neighborhood and those in a “good” Jerusalem neighborhood did not change as a result of Project Renewal.

Why did the image and status of IGKM remain unchanged, despite the many improvements to the neighborhood, as also proved to be the case in many of the other Project Renewal neighborhoods (Carmon and Baron, 1994)? There are several reasonable answers to this question which are related to the specifics of Project Renewal, but there is also a general explanation which the researchers should have guessed in advance. As long as 50 years ago, Walter Firey (1947) showed his readers that the image of a neighborhood depends not so much on the quality of its instrumentality, as on the perception of it as a place suited to “respectable” people. In keeping with this principle, and in line with the wealth of evidence collected during the past 50 years, we should have known that the status of residential areas is determined first and foremost by the socioeconomic status of its residents, which is a much more powerful factor than the material living conditions in the neighborhood. Therefore, and this is a very important research-based conclusion, programs of the Second Generation type such as Israel’s Project Renewal, which from the outset preclude changes in the neighborhood population (relocation or gentrification and any other kind), can benefit the people but cannot change the status of their neighborhood, at least not as seen by non-residents.

3.3. Third Generation: Florentine – revitalization in the center of Tel Aviv metropolitan area

Florentine is a small neighborhood, one of the oldest in Tel Aviv, the first “Hebrew city” which was founded in 1909. As with many of Tel Aviv’s distressed neighbor-
terior renovation of buildings (tarring of roofs, plastering, painting, care of yards, etc.). In addition, rather large sums were invested in the renovation and operation of kindergartens and a community center. Small sums were offered as loans for interior renovation of the apartments.

Within five years, highly significant changes took place in Florentine: about 600 apartments, which had previously been used for business purposes or storage, or had stood empty, were reconverted for residential use and occupied by new owners or tenants. A few hundred new residents either replaced older occupants in the existing housing stock, or occupied four new buildings and the newly added upper floors of several older buildings, the construction of which was made possible by a revised Municipal Building Plan. The total number of residents in the neighborhood almost doubled, reaching some 5500 by mid-1995. The new population is a combination of two large groups: about 1200 new immigrants who found there inexpensive, centrally located housing, and about 1300 people who can be classified as a gentrifying population: unmarried and newly married young people, mostly without children, many of them students or new university graduates.

During that period, some 600 applications were submitted to the municipality for permits to open new businesses in the Florentine quarter. The majority of those who applied did in fact open businesses in the neighborhood, mostly in units that had been abandoned by workshops and small industries, such as upholstery and carpentry shops, which had been a nuisance to the residents. Eating places and places of entertainment – coffee shops, restaurants and pubs – were dominant among the new businesses, but art galleries, design shops and shops for the sale of furniture, arts and crafts were also prominent.

Were the goals of the municipal renewal project of Florentine advanced? There is no doubt that the image of the neighborhood has improved and it is now seen as a place in which it is worth buying or renting an apartment, or investing in the development of a business, as well as a place to visit and shop. The improved image is also expressed in the purchase price of apartments, which doubled in the first half of the 1990s (compared with an average increase of approximately 50% in Tel Aviv) and approached the average price for Tel Aviv apartments of the same size. The success in attracting new residents – doubling the population within five years – is impressive.

However, according to Eres and Carmon (1996), the picture is not entirely rosy. The goal of improving quality of life in the neighborhood has been met only to a modest degree. The quality of housing has generally remained poor. The amount of educational and leisure time services has increased to some extent, but the quality is still considered inferior and insufficient to support families with children. Some of the streets and infrastructure have been improved, but many sections have remained untouched and suffer from serious defects. Insufficient sanitation and street cleaning services are still a cause for complaint in some areas. Both old and new businesses create rather serious disturbances by day and by night.

Moreover, several unplanned changes have taken place in the neighborhood, most of them not for the better. The revitalization process resulted in a steep increase in rents, as a consequence of which some of the incumbent tenants, those who could not afford the new increases, were pushed out; luckily, this was not a common problem, because the old rent control law, which is still valid for much of the housing stock in this area, protected many of the old-timers. Businesses which had been in the neighborhood for quite a long time were forced to leave their locations, without compensation of any kind for the high cost of relocation. Too many eating places and places of entertainment were opened, many of them in an area where residential occupancy was also strengthened; the accompanying irritations of noise, dirt and bad odors are highly disturbing to the occupants.

Of all the unplanned changes, the most prominent was the resulting transitory nature of the neighborhood. The majority of new residents rented apartments in Florentine and did not invest in the purchase of dwelling units there. As expressed in their answers, most of them see their residence there as temporary. This is equally true for the young, middle class residents, for the new immigrants, and certainly for the not so few foreign workers who have found temporary refuge there.

The characteristics of the renewal process in Florentine were typical of neighborhood regeneration of the Third Generation:

- A process whose origin was spontaneous but whose continuation was at least partly planned.
- A process involving many small investors from the private sector, especially home and business owners who put up most of the investment capital, side by side with a few larger private developers and public investors, especially the local municipality.
- Most of the main regeneration types analyzed above could be identified in the project: gentrification, upgrading by incumbent residents, upgrading by new immigrants, and planned initiation of entertainment and commercial centers.

- The prominent results of the process are:
  (a) The neighborhood serves as a temporary transit station for many of its new occupants, rather than as a permanent place of residence;
  (b) The process has been more beneficial to “strong” players (landlords, owners of new businesses and in particular the municipality) than to “weaker” ones (incumbent residents and new tenants);
3.4. Three generations: the main lessons

Because of the careful selection of the above three case studies as representative examples of the three generations of policies, we may use them to draw the main policy lessons of several decades of planned intervention in distressed urban areas. The following condensed list may be useful for memorizing them.

First Generation – A series of “nos”: no to physical determinism, the belief that a change in the physical environment has a decisive impact on the social behavior; no to massive demolition and massive displacement of incumbent residents; no to mega-structures for poor populations.

Second Generation – Working for and with the existing population only and avoiding deliberate changes in the composition of the local population may be highly beneficial to the local residents, but hardly produce any “positive externalities” nor does it improve the status of the area.

Third Generation – Public-private regeneration initiatives and gentrification processes have frequently had a positive influence on the status of the involved areas, however: they have been limited to a few major cities and to a few relatively small areas within theses cities; incumbent residents seldom benefit, more often are hurt and even displaced; they tend to create “islands of revitalization within seas of decline” and to increase disparities between the “haves” and “have-nots”.

4. Towards an effective approach to regenerating residential areas: benefiting both people and places

A summary of the above analysis shows that in most of the places in which they were applied, especially in the US, First Generation slum clearance projects caused harm to the residents and communities which were removed. Moreover, the time required to complete the redevelopment plans – typically 20–40 years – put heavy economic burdens on both the public and private bodies involved in these projects. The comprehensive programs of the Second Generation, in the cases where they were actually implemented, were beneficial to the residents and their children and to some extent reduced the gaps between them and the more affluent groups, but did not generally succeed in changing the low status of the neighborhoods or stopping the flight of the “stronger” households from them. Neighborhood revitalization of the Third Generation, in its common patterns of gentrification and property-led regeneration, has frequently resulted in rapid improvement of the neighborhood status and a rise of property values, but in most cases has hurt, or at best has not helped, the incumbent residents.

In light of past failures or partial successes only, we have to reconsider two questions: Is revitalization of old urban residential areas still a viable goal at the end of the twentieth century? and, if so, is it manageable in a way that can benefit both the people (primarily the residents of the target areas) and the urban areas under treatment?

My answer to the first question is unhesitatingly positive, for a number of reasons:

(a) The need to renew the city centers for the important functions which they fulfill in the economy and society of the post-industrial era (Sassen, 1994; Shore, 1995) – our cumulative experience teaches us that successful city centers are those which include not only economic functions, but also stable residential areas.

(b) The reluctance to destroy old urban fabrics for social, historical and esthetic reasons.

(c) The desire and the need to reduce the gaps between the “haves”, most of whom live in prestige housing, and the “have nots”, most of whom are concentrated in distressed residential areas – these gaps have been widening in the recent period of globalization and restructuring of the economy (Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991; Sassen, 1991; Fainstein, Gordon and Harloe, 1992; Kasadra, 1993; O’Loughlin and Fridrichs, 1996); planned intervention for reducing them is required for ideological reasons of social justice, as well as for practical reasons, among which are the fear of social unrest on a broad scale (Galbraith, 1992) and the finding of negative relationship between inequality and economic growth in democratic societies (Persson and Tabellini, 1994).

All these reasons justify a special effort to develop and test effective approaches for urban renewal and regeneration. An approach which has good chance of being effective in terms of benefiting both people and places is proposed below. It is based mainly on the lessons learned from the above analysis, but also on consideration of current trends in the political economy of developed countries. It is composed of two strategic and three tactical principles.

The strategic principles are:

• Preventing the segregation of the lower classes. A major cause of neighborhood deterioration, which is at the same time a cause and symptom of deterioration, is the residential segregation of the lower classes, which is a consequence of the tendency of the middle classes to distance themselves from the lower classes. Moreover, the most severe urban problems, including the development of the so-called underclass, occur in racially and economically segregated urban areas. In order to prevent such problems, planners should ad-
vocate forms of population mix. This is more easily said than done, but there are some reliable guidelines in the professional literature which indicate useful (as opposed to counter-productive) methods for achieving population mix (Carmon, 1976; Varady and Raffel, 1995; Carmon, 1997). The mix can be achieved sometimes within a housing project and oftentimes within broader urban areas; sometimes by moving poor people to the suburbs and more often by attracting the better-offs back to the city.

• Working simultaneously for economic development and social equity. If both goals are to be promoted, the analysis of “who pays and who benefits” should be used as a main criterion for selecting projects for urban regeneration. Several researchers and practitioners, who emphasize benefits to the local residents, recommend kinds of “linkage” projects in areas of economic revitalization (Frieden and Kaplan, 1990). Others, like Porter (1995), hope to benefit all groups by materializing the potential for economic competitiveness hidden in central cities. It may be advisable to follow some of Porter’s suggestions, provided that encouraging competitiveness is not a substitute but rather a complementary component of urban policy, as he himself suggests (Porter, 1997, p. 3).

The tactical principles are:

• Regeneration through partnerships. In light of the political and economic trends at the end of the 20th century, the only chance to recruit the public support and the capital required for projects of regeneration is to create partnerships. Funding and management skills for regeneration projects ought to come from all three sectors of the economy: the public and private sectors and the “third sector” of not-for-profit organizations. One promising strategy of partnership has recently been proposed by Metzger (1997), who calls for “aggressive” public–private lending and investment plans in distressed urban areas, coordinated by community stakeholders. Planners are charged with the task of using their new talents as negotiators and deal-makers to promote cooperation among the various sectors and between them and the residents.

• A gradual, soft approach. Sensitive planning, in an attempt to preserve old social and physical systems alongside the introduction of new ones. Emphasizing this principle has become especially important in light of a recent tendency (especially with regard to deteriorating public housing areas in the US) to go back to the method of total demolition (Brown, 1997). Similar tendencies were identified in Britain and in Israel. This is happening in spite of what we were supposed to learn about total demolition in the First Generation of urban renewal, and in spite of interesting recent findings regarding the success of gradual rehabilitation efforts (Vale, 1995) and of projects that combined demolition and renovation (Goody, 1997).

• Differential treatment of different deteriorated residential areas. Whereas mass production was the hallmark of the industrial era, the new, post-industrial period is characterized by diversification of products and life styles. The contrast between a single type of a solution for all deteriorated areas, typical of past generations of areal remedies, and the differential treatment proposed here is in line with this trend. A critical distinction is between areas which have reasonable chances of being regenerated and those that are found not to justify preservation and rehabilitation, the “non-viable” in Krumholz and Star (1996) terms (a decision to designate an area as non-viable should be taken very carefully, mainly on the basis of social evidence). Residents of non-viable areas can be served by person-oriented type of programs, such as the Moving-to-Opportunity American program which leads to voluntary deconcentration (Temkin and Rhoe, 1996). As for those targeted for revitalization, and therefore, appropriate for area-targeted programs, the main distinction is between neighborhoods in “hot demand areas” (Price, 1991) and others. The first kind attracts spontaneous gentrification and property-led revitalization, which planner may be able to modify to attain both desirable population mix and development with equity. For the second type, a two-stage strategy is proposed. The aim of the first stage is to work with the incumbent residents to improve their environment (housing and social services), bringing it closer to that of “good” neighborhoods; the goal of the second stage is to break through the segregation lines of distressed neighborhoods, turning them into an integral parts of broader, higher status urban quarters (Carmon, 1997).

None of the above principles by itself is a new idea of the author of this paper. The originality is in the combination of the five and in singularizing the first two, which are related to the causes of urban decline, and therefore, observing them may prevent deterioration, not only alleviate it.

I hope that nobody takes these five principles as a list of nice but non-attainable slogans. Indeed, each one of them is still in a stage of experimentation, but there is more than some evidence (part of it documented in the references mentioned above) to support the claim that each has contributed to regenerating distressed urban areas. Designing programs by the five principles is suggested as a way to effectively promote the goal of benefiting both people and places, in times of austerity and reduced support of planned intervention in general, and of intervention in favor of poor people and areas in particular.

Additional research is required to support the above, a research which will expand our understanding of the theories on which the principles are based and the
practice of their implementation under specific conditions and circumstances. Most worthy of research attention are the ways to promote social integration between members of the lower and the somewhat higher status groups of society, the methods of attaining local economic growth together with increased social equity, and the creation of successful partnerships among the three sectors of the economy and between them and the local residents.

Acknowledgements

This paper was completed while the author was a guest of the Department of Urban Studies and Planning and the Center for International Studies, both at MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). The author would like to express her thanks to Prof. Bish Sanyal, the head of the department, and Prof. Kenneth Oye, the head of the center, for their support and for the fertilizing environment each of them has created.

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