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Socio-spatial Mix and Inter-ethnic Attitudes: Jewish Newcomers and Arab-Jewish Issues in the Galilee¹

OREN YIFTACHEL AND NAOMI CARMON

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ABSTRACT *Urban and regional planners tend to recommend spatial mix of socially diverse populations as an appropriate strategy to achieve social equity and improve inter-group relations. However, the actual impact of such a mix on social relations in general, and inter-ethnic attitudes in particular, has been subject to on-going, yet inconclusive, debates among social scientists. This paper adds to the study of these issues by examining the inter-ethnic attitudes of residents in Jewish 'new settlements' (elsewhere termed 'community settlements', or 'mitzpim'), which were established some 15 years ago among the Arab villages of Israel's central Galilee region. We found that despite certain strands of ethnocentrism, most Jewish settlers hold significantly more moderate views on Arab-Jewish issues than: (a) the general (non-Galilee) Jewish public in Israel; and (b) the region's Arab population. The influence of the socio-spatial mix on the moderation of hostile attitudes, at least among the Jews, is analyzed and explained by comparing our data with the findings of previous research on the topic. On the basis of that comparison we conclude that the Arab-Jewish mix in the Galilee, along with socio-economic characteristics of the Jewish population and the existence of a 'penetrating group phenomenon', have combined to moderate Jewish attitudes in the study region. Planners are called upon to use this knowledge.*

1. Introduction

Improving inter-group relations by 'mixing' diverse populations in neighbourhoods, towns and regions, has for long been a recommended strategy by urban and regional planners. The impact of such mix on social and inter-ethnic attitudes has been subject to on-going, yet inconclusive, debates among social scientists, particularly from human geography, urban planning and urban sociology.

In this paper we aim to shed further light on this debate, by reporting on a study of inter-ethnic attitudes in an Arab-Jewish mixed region—the central Galilee in Northern Israel.² We first outline briefly previous scientific knowledge on social and ethnic spatial mix, and then proceed to provide a short background on the case study area—the regional council of Misgav. We continue by presenting our research procedure and findings, including details of an attitudinal survey conducted among Jewish settlers of the new settlements that were erected during the late 1970s and early 1980s in between the Arab villages of the Galilee (elsewhere called 'mitzpim' or 'communal settlements'—see Carmon, 1994). The survey

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results are documented, interpreted and compared with other surveys, conducted among Israel's general Jewish population and among Arabs in the Galilee. We conclude the paper by briefly discussing the implications of the findings to Arab-Jewish coexistence in the Galilee and by linking the findings back to theories of social and ethnic mix. The main conclusion of the paper is that socio-spatial mix can contribute to moderating inter-ethnic relations, provided that certain conditions—some of which are tractable by planners—are preserved or introduced into the process.

2. Socio-spatial Mix: Normative and Empirical Perspectives

The treatment of space-related social mix in general and ethnic mix in particular by social scientists and planning theorists may be divided into two distinct perspectives: normative and analytical. The former consists mainly of writings advocating the spatial mixing of socially diverse populations, while the latter is made up of studies which empirically examine the impacts of mixing. A brief exposition of some of the publications from each perspective is referred to.

The idea that territorial mix of different social groups is good for the society has long roots in the writings of social reformers and planning theorists. The social utopians of former centuries, such as Owen and Buckingham, designed their versions of 'ideal cities', with 'social mix' and 'balanced communities—mainly of socio-economic groups—as one of the central planning principles (Cherry, 1988). The first planned project which tried to implement the idea was the Cadbury Project, one of the Quakers settlements in England of the middle nineteenth century. This project had a considerable impact on the planning ideas of Ebenezer Howard, who wrote *The Garden Cities of Tomorrow* (1898), the little book that has influenced city planning in the twentieth century more than any single work. Later on, prominent planners advocated similar ideas. Charles Abrams presented mixed housing, mixed from the point of view of the ethnic origin of the residents, as the main means for achieving 'racial justice'. Louis Mumford saw mixed communities of low income and middle income households as a prerequisite to the functioning of public services of reasonable quality.

The concept of a 'balanced community', containing a heterogeneous population by age and class, grew in popularity during the 1930s and 1940s and became an important objective of the Reith Committee, established in 1945 to plan the British new towns (Sarkissian *et al.*, 1990). Planning theorists in the US were influenced by the same ideas and concepts, but because racial and ethnic problems, interrelated with income and class dilemmas, dominated their social environment, many of them viewed fighting racial discrimination as the leading goal. Within "the vicious circle of inequalities, prejudice, discrimination and segregation" (De Marco & Galster, 1993), planners identified housing segregation as a target for public intervention, aiming at breaking the circle. According to this approach, it is worthwhile intervening because segregation strengthens existing inequalities and reinforces prejudice, while mixed housing increases opportunities, contributes to social harmony by promoting tolerance and reducing tension between the different groups, encourages cultural cross-fertilization and reflects the diversity of the urbanized modern world. However, achieving the planning goal of mixed housing encountered the reality of homogeneous housing as a preferred arrangement by most citizens.

Scholars who studied urban structure and urban change have shown an unfettered tendency among most groups to congregate in socially and ethnically homogeneous neighbourhoods and localities, i.e. they practise social segregation. The theoretical and empirical works of Badcock (1984, 1994); Boal (1987); Eyles (1990); Forester & Krumholtz (1990); Gans (1991); Harvey (1992); Marcuse (1993, 1996); Massey (1985); Massey & Danton (1993); and Soja (1989, 1995), have all highlighted the mechanisms of residential segregation, embedded

in the processes of socio-economic and housing development in Western cities. It is worthwhile mentioning here that the segregation phenomenon is often the consequence of the desires of both sides; the powerful groups tend to support it, and it frequently arises also from within distinct ethnic and racial groups who voluntarily congregate in specific locations, for the purpose of cultural survival (Boal, 1987; Dunn, 1993; Sack, 1993). The issue of white flight from racially integrated neighbourhoods has been extensively studied in the US (Galster, 1990; Goering, 1978; Massey & Danton, 1993; Schelling, 1972; Schwab & Marsh, 1980). It seems, however, that more than this flight may be attributed to the attitudes of the movers towards blacks; it is probably related to the personal feeling of threat that is caused by a 'critical mass' of people with different characteristics (Boal, 1987).²

In the context of this paper we do not deal with the causes of segregation and its development, but rather with some of the consequences measured in cases of socio-spatial integration. As noted earlier, planners tend to advocate such integration, and the question is whether it can be justified on the basis of empirical research. In other words: to what extent do the results of empirical studies provide us with valid and reliable evidence as to the power of integration to achieve the goals attributed to it? We are especially interested in the impact of various forms of spatial mix on the attitudes of the involved groups towards each other, i.e. we focus on studies that clearly address the 'contact hypothesis' which posits that one's attitudes and behaviour towards members of a disliked social category will become more positive after direct inter-personal interaction with them.

Several old studies and a few newer ones reported that whites who lived in racially mixed housing were less prejudiced and held less rigid stereotypes of blacks, compared to those who had no experience of living together (Amir, 1976; Deutsch & Collins, 1951; Mear & Freedman, 1966; Merton *et al.*, 1949; Miller & Brewer, 1984; Pettigrew, 1969; Rose *et al.*, 1969; Schuman *et al.*, 1985; Wilner *et al.*, 1952, 1955). On the other hand, other researchers found that whites who lived in white blocks were less prejudiced than whites who resided in blocks with a large percentage of black inhabitants (Fishman, 1961; Wolf, 1963). Similarly, according to findings from national surveys of mixed neighbourhoods in the US (such as Bradburn *et al.*, 1971), the attitudes of whites who lived in areas with large and growing rates of black residents were less favourable towards blacks than those of whites in areas with just a few black neighbours.

The findings of these various empirical studies teach us that socio-spatial mix of different social groups can have positive (if it is agreeable that being less prejudiced is something positive) as well as negative consequences, depending on: (a) the characteristics of the involved populations; (b) the characteristics of the environment in which the contact takes place; and (c) the dynamics of the mix process.

The most relevant group characteristic in this context is the extent of difference (or 'social distance') between the involved groups, extent that can be measured in at least two ways: first, the number of different dimensions weighed by their importance in the case under discussion (examples of dimensions: racial/ethnic/national origin, religious affiliation, socio-economic status, age and stage in life cycle, length of time in the country/region; in some cases religious affiliation is the most important dimension, and in others it may be race and/or socio-economic status); and second, the degree of difference within each dimension (for example, the degree of difference between black and white people is higher than that between whites whose ancestors came from England and Scandinavia). The general rules are as follows: the fewer the number of dimensions of important difference between the involved groups and the less the degree of difference within each important dimension, the better the chances of spatial proximity to influence positively the attitudes of the involved persons (Carmon, 1995). In addition, wherever there is a significant degree of difference in an important dimension, it can be 'compensated' by similarity in another important dimension.

The best documented example for the last rule are the cases in which spatial proximity of whites to blacks in the US reduced negative attitudes, when the involved groups were of equal socio-economic status (Amir, 1976). Another example was reported from Israel, where it is common to find that Jews from a European origin are prejudiced against Jews from Middle Eastern origin; a research of inter-ethnic attitudes found that living in a heterogeneous cluster of housing significantly reduced the level of prejudice, and the researchers explained that the status of being a new immigrant was a common denominator that 'compensated' for the important differences in origin and socio-economic status (Carmon & Mannheim, 1979).

Former research also shows that the specific background conditions of each case influence the consequences of proximity between different groups. The chances for improving inter-group attitudes are much higher in a period of economic growth, compared to times of economic depression and high unemployment rates in the studied area. Where public opinion supports inter-group relationships, this positively influences the attitudes of individual citizens. Common interests that are related to sharing a common space may also play an important positive role (Carmon, 1976).

Along with the characteristics of the involved groups and the background conditions, the dynamics of the process of socio-spatial mix influences its consequences. It rarely happens that residents enter an area that is heterogeneous from its first days; when it does (in cases of public housing, for example), it creates a positive point of departure for inter-group relationships, because there is no thread of unexpected appearance of an unwanted group (Deutsch & Collins, 1951). A much more common case is the penetration of minority and/or poor households to a middle-class neighbourhood; their entrance reduces the property value of the veteran group, generates deterioration, causes inter-group tension and strengthens prejudice (Galster, 1990; Wolf, 1963). Different dynamics, such as the entrance of higher-status groups into poor areas, with or without displacement of the veteran residents, have hardly been studied from the point of view of their impact on inter-group attitudes and behaviour.

The main point to emerge from this brief discussion of spatial mix of different social groups is the mismatch between the normative theories which keep advocating social and ethnic mix as a way of improving inter-group coexistence, and the reserved and inconclusive empirical evidence collected in mixed environments. There appears to be a shortage of empirical findings on the topic, especially from places other than the US, and particularly with an attention to the dynamics of the process which is (unlike other involved variables) partly controllable by planning actions. Moreover, most of the empirical studies were conducted in small geographic areas, a block or a housing project, while the larger units that are frequently subject to planned intervention—city areas as well as rural regions—were neglected by most researchers. Our research of the impact of Arab–Jewish spatial mix on inter-group attitudes in Israel's Galilee region therefore intends to fill some scholarly gaps identified earlier and provide planners with a better understanding of the influences of socio-spatial mix.

3. The Central Galilee: Background

In the middle of the 1970s a population of about 300 000 persons resided in the central Galilee which can roughly be described as a triangle between Zefat, Nazareth and Shlomi (Figure 1). Most of its residents—about three-quarters—were Arabs: Muslims, Christians and Druze. In the largest Arab city of Nazareth there were some 40 000 residents; the other Arabs resided in five large villages (7000–15 000) and dozens of small villages. The Jewish population—about 75 000—was concentrated mainly in five development towns; about 20 000 in 60 villages, most of which were collective villages: kibbutzim—established mainly in the 1930s and 1940s, and moshavim—established mainly in the 1950s and 1960s (CBS, 1972–1995).

During the 1970s, following a growth in the militancy of the Arabs in the Galilee and




Figure 1. Settlements in central Galilee.

increasing levels of political mobilization and organization, Israeli policy-makers were worried about the emergence of Arab-Palestinian irredentism in the region. In order to avert this perceived danger, a governmental decision was made to establish a large number of scattered Jewish settlements as wedges between the large Arab villages in the region. This strategy was expected to retard the development of a regional Palestinian-Arab political consciousness, which could—according to governmental policy-makers—destabilize the state of Israel (Kipnis, 1987; Soffer & Finkel, 1991; Yiftachel, 1992).

Thus, the leading goal of the new settlement in the Galilee was geo-political—the wish of the government (headed by the rightist Likud party) to populate larger parts of the Galilee with Jewish settlers and to halt an alleged Arab continued occupation of state lands (Yiftachel, 1991). This geopolitical goal must be understood within the historical context of Arab-Jewish relations in the Galilee and the impact of Israeli policies on these relations. Against a backdrop of a continuing Middle Eastern conflict, Israeli policies have attempted to control the region's Arab population mainly by limiting its economic, territorial and political resources. Accordingly, the government imposed military rule over the Arabs between 1948 and 1966, during which period it also expropriated about 60% of Arab-owned land (Yiftachel, 1992). Jewish settlement of the Galilee should therefore be regarded as part and parcel of the government's attempt to increase Jewish domination in the region.

In addition to this geo-political goal outlined above, the Galilee settlement plan also had social, economic and environmental objectives, all of which were subjects of an evaluation study conducted by the second author of this paper and her colleagues (Carmon, 1994; Carmon *et al.*, 1990). It should be noted that this eminent list of objectives did not mention intra-regional relationships, not among Jews (residents of the old and the new settlements) nor between Jews and Arabs.

Moreover, the settlement plan of the Galilee was prepared without consulting the residents of the region (Yiftachel, 1993). The heads of the Jewish development towns in the area would have preferred to absorb the new residents in new neighbourhoods within their towns, and not to see them in separate settlements, but their opinions were not considered. Needless to say, no one bothered to ask for the conceptions of the Arab residents of the area, and their protests concerning the inclusion of pieces of land they own within the borders of the new settlements (without offending their rights) were frequently ignored.

In order to implement the Galilee plan, the government of Israel and the Jewish Agency (a quasi-governmental body with development powers) created a range of incentives to attract the desirable population to the region: state land at very low costs, physical infrastructure at negligible costs, generous housing assistance, and high quality municipal and educational services. The 'natural' process that aided the settlement activity was the increasing number of young middle-class Jewish families looking for semi-rural life style, in what was elsewhere termed 'counter-urbanization' (Berry, 1979) or 'ex-suburbanization' (Friedmann, 1988). These people were looking for improvement in their environmental and social residential settings, away from Israel's typically high density urban centres. During that period, urban planners in Israel faced rigid constraints (imposed from above) on the rezoning of agricultural land for urban development. Under such conditions, migration to a new settlement in the Galilee was only one of the viable avenues open to young couples for a 'home and garden' life style.

The Israeli planning authorities vested with the settlers the power to screen potential new residents according to their "suitability to the new life-style in a small Galilee settlement" (Interviews, 1992–1994). This has enabled each community to form 'social walls' around it, and accept only the 'best' candidates they could attract. Consequently, most of the new settlements have developed into enclaves of young highly educated middle-class residents of quite homogeneous social and ideological backgrounds (Shefer *et al.*, 1992).

Within a few years, mainly between 1979 and 1982, 52 new settlements were erected (Carmon *et al.*, 1990; Lipshitz, 1993). This decisive action almost doubled the number of Jewish rural settlements in the hilly Galilee and largely increased the extent of spatial proximity between Jewish and Arab settlements (Figure 1). As of 1994, there were 12 500 residents in the new settlements, who constituted 11% of the Jewish population in the area. The size of the Arab population in the region reached 354 000 persons. Due to the large difference between the rates of natural increase of Arab and Jewish populations, the percentage of Jews in the hilly Galilee has remained as it was 10 years ago, despite the considerable Jewish immigration into the region; the Jews are no more than a quarter of the population in the hilly Galilee.

As mentioned earlier, the project of new settlements in the Galilee has largely increased the inter-ethnic spatial mix in the region. As can be seen in Figure 1, distances between Arab and Jewish settlements are often less than one kilometre. Due to its relatively small size, the Galilee area—despite its somewhat rural character—is an appropriate arena in which to examine the impact of ethnic spatial mix of the formation of attitudes. Given that it is now over 15 years since the establishment of most of the new settlements, the time is right to examine several aspects of the regional mix in the Galilee 'on their own accord', and thereby enlighten students of spatial planning and ethnic relations.

4. The Survey

Our investigation focused on the Misgav regional council (a local government unit for non-urban settlements) and the contact of its Jewish residents with residents of the surrounding Arab villages and municipalities. The Misgav council was established in 1983 to coordinate service delivery to 28 of the new settlements built in the Galilee during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Misgav is an appropriate case study, as it is the largest and most diverse regional council in the central Galilee, bordering a range of Arab towns and villages in what is commonly perceived as the 'heartland' of Arab regionalism in Israel (see, for example, Yiftachel, 1992). The Misgav council itself also includes a sizeable Arab population, estimated at 3200 people in 1994 (Interviews, 1994), composed mainly of Bedouin-Arabs who have settled in small hamlets and villages during the last century. As such, the study of the inter-ethnic attitudes in and around the Misgav council is likely to illuminate aspects of attitude formation among populations highly exposed to their ethnic neighbours.

A survey was conducted among Jewish residents of seven settlements in the Misgav council: Yuvalim, Tzurit, Koranit, Ya'ad, Manof, Gilon and Tuval (Figure 1).³ At the beginning of 1994, 200 'drop and collect' questionnaires were distributed among their residents. Sixty of the 200 were targeted to 'local leaders', in order to facilitate comparison to a previous survey conducted among Arab local leaders in the Galilee (Yiftachel & Law Yone, 1995). 'Local leaders' were defined as current members of either their settlement committee—an elected local body responsible for the allocation of small resources and local services within the settlements, or members of the Misgav council assembly—an elected regional body responsible for the allocation of considerable regional resources and for the council's spatial, planning and education policies. It should be noted here that these local leaders were elected for relatively short periods, and accordingly had a high rate of rotation; their socio-economic and demographic characteristics were nearly identical to the general population of the new settlements; consequently, the combination of the two groups (local leaders and settlers) into aggregate figures of 'Jewish attitudes' was possible, without causing undue distortion. The 'drop and collect' survey was completed by 137 people, of which 48 were local leaders, representing a response rate of 63.6% among the general population, and 80% among local Jewish leaders.

The analysis of the responses to the questionnaires performed below uses four main methods:

- (1) documenting the perceived level of contact in various domains of life between the new Jewish residents and their Arab neighbours;
- (2) analyzing the attitudes of Jewish settlers towards a range of key issues pertaining to Arab-Jewish relations;
- (3) comparing the attitudes of Jewish settlers in the Galilee to a nation-wide sample of the Jewish public;
- (4) comparing the attitudes of Jewish and Arab local leaders in the Galilee.

5. Inter-ethnic Contact and Cooperation

The Jewish population of Misgav regional council, like the population of the new settlements in general, is largely homogeneous, consisting of young families, usually a mother and a father with one to three children; both parents have higher than secondary education and white-collar occupations, i.e. even though they live in the countryside, they seem to be part of the 'new middle class' (see Ley, 1994). There were in 1994 some 7500 Jewish residents (including more than 3000 children, aged 0-14) in the settlements of Misgav regional council and we

Table 1. Type and frequency of personal Jewish contact with Arabs (%)

Activity type	Several times/year	Twice times/year	Once a year	Every 2-3 years	Never
Activity in non-political organizations	5.5	0.8	4.7	3.1	85.9
Joint party (political) activity	—	—	0.8	1.5	97.7
Joint sporting activity	3.1	3.8	3.8	4.6	84.6
Joint business meetings	30.8	6.2	6.9	3.8	52.3
Attending family celebrations	11.0	6.2	10.8	19.2	52.3
Joint children play	4.7	3.9	7.0	9.3	75.2
Joint entertainment activity	3.1	2.3	2.3	1.6	90.7
Mutual social visits	13.8	6.9	10.8	15.4	53.1

interviewed 137 of the adults. Because of the fairly homogeneous structure of the population, it is reasonable to see the interviewees as representatives of the population at large.

When asked about their main motivation for migrating to their present Galilee settlement, 15% of the interviewees stated a wish for a 'home and garden' lifestyle, 28% a desire to live in a 'communal settlement' (i.e. a settlement with active community life and some degree of cooperation and group discipline, sometimes with and sometimes without a local economic base), and 41%—a search for 'high environmental and residential quality'. Hence, a total of 85% selected quality of life factors as prime motives for living in the Galilee. Nobody pointed at finding employment in the region as his/her main reason for coming to the Galilee, and only 1.5% mentioned that they were attracted by the expected economic return on their investments. There were 5.3% who stated that a desire 'to contribute to the Judaization of Galilee' served as their main reason for migrating into the region.

With this background in mind, we can turn to the examination of Jewish behaviour and attitudes pertaining to inter-ethnic relationships. Table 1 documents the frequency of contact between Jewish new settlers of the Galilee and their Arab neighbours. It shows that a decade since the establishment of Misgav and some 15 years after most of the new settlements were established, common economic activity between Arabs and Jews is developing, but social contacts are fairly rare. Indeed, some 20% of the interviewees take part from time to time in mutual social visits and attend family celebrations, but there are just a few who meet in non-political organizations, in sporting or entertainment activities.

Comparison of our data with a previous survey conducted in 1988 (Carmon *et al.*, 1990), indicates that only very small advancement towards inter-ethnic social interaction has occurred in the region during the intervening 6 years. Although the previous survey used different categories, it did portray a similar picture of voluntary Jewish isolation in most areas, concluding that: "personally, the new settlers are satisfied with low levels of contact with the Arabs" (Carmon *et al.*, 1990, p. 159). Another previous survey conducted among Arabs in the region also indicated very low levels of joint, activity, and even a degree of inter-ethnic hostility (Yiftachel & Law Yone, 1995). In general, then, we can trace a pattern of 'on-going mutual segregation' between Arabs and Jews in the region, in nearly all fields of life, except for economic activity. However, as shown later, despite this low level of inter-ethnic contact, there is still more Arab-Jewish contact in the Galilee than in most other regions of Israel.

The pattern of segregation changed when respondents reported about their willingness to cooperate with Arabs in the future. As shown in Figure 2, there was a high level of willingness to cooperate on issues relating to regional economic development (74%) and a moderate wish to cooperate in developing municipal services (44%), where Jews could have tried to protect




Figure 2. Desired areas for future inter-council cooperation.

the superior levels of services in their settlements. Highly significant is the fairly high level of willingness to cooperate on matters of joint education to the children (56%). The areas of cultural and recreational activities showed the lowest levels of willingness for future inter-ethnic cooperation (35% and 30%), but even in these areas the rates are not negligible.

Another area of interest in the context of Arab-Jewish contact and cooperation, is the attitudes of Jews towards the desired future of the region, as displayed in Table 2. The table is separated into three groups of attitudes regarding plans for the future. In the first group we see a very strong support for future joint activity of Jewish and Arab children (but they remain in their separate schools), strong support for common economic development (in this case a shopping centre) and for spending public Misgav resources on encouraging Arab-Jewish integration. In the second group, there is an intermediate level of support (somewhat above 40%) for future integration in what are now exclusively Jewish services: cultural and sporting facilities, including the local swimming pool. Finally, there is a clear objection of a large majority of the respondents to future living together with Arabs in their settlements; they want to keep the Jewish character of Misgav and they refuse to open their settlements to all, based on economic ability to pay for a house in the village. It is unclear whether this objection is related to ethno-centrism or to general refusal to give up the homogeneous composition of the population of the new settlements (young families of the Jewish upper middle class), which applies to lower-status groups of Jews as it applies to Arabs.

The attitudes displayed above indicate that the Jewish tendency towards segregation is strong 'closest to home', decreases as activities move further into the public realm, and almost diminish when it comes to economic cooperation. An exceptional item in this pattern is the strong support of common educational activity of Jewish and Arab children, because children are part of 'home' and not of the 'public realm'. Educating children to meet and accept 'the different one' is an essential part of the liberal philosophy of the 'new middle class', which seem to characterize the Jewish settlers of the Galilee. The next section of this paper includes a broader discussion of this point.

Table 2. Attitudes towards future plans for Jewish–Arab cooperation

	Support	No opinion	Object
1. Common activity of children from Jewish and Arab schools	82.7	9.0	8.3
2. Building of new shopping centres for joint Arab–Jewish use	68.8	12.2	19.1
3. Spending public Misgav resources on encouraging Arab–Jewish integration	64.1	13.0	22.9
4. Building a joint cinema for Arabs and Jews in the region	41.5	22.3	36.1
5. Opening Misgav sporting and cultural facilities to Arab use	43.6	18.8	37.8
6. Opening the swimming pool in your settlement to Arabs paid use	31.0	17.2	52.7
7. Establishment of joint Arab–Jewish settlements or neighbourhoods	13.0	22.0	65.0
8. Making residence in Misgav villages open to all, based on economic ability	13.7	6.1	80.3
9. Keeping the Jewish character of Misgav	83.2	9.2	7.6

6. Attitudes Towards Key Arab–Jewish Issues

Table 3 documents the attitudes of the respondents, Jewish settlers of the Galilee, towards statements on Arab–Jewish key issues in the region. The table is divided—by our interpretation of the type of answers we received—into three sub-groups of statements.

The distribution of responses to the first sub-group shows that most Jewish settlers view coexistence with Arabs in the region as unproblematic. This approach may be interpreted as a result of their ethnocentrism and their being unaware of the deep meaning of Jewish settlement in the region to its Arab inhabitants (as a blatant instrument of state control), and the difficult transformations with which Arabs had to deal during the rapid changes in the region since the late 1940s (such as land losses, the problems of refugees and drastic changes in lifestyle).

The first three statements in Table 3 well illustrate the ‘no problem’ approach: a large majority supported the view that there was no tension between Jews and Arabs in the Galilee, and even the Intifada (the uprising of the Palestinians in the occupied territories in the late 1980s) did not disturb the non-problematic situation in the Galilee. These statements reveal a high degree of optimism, typical to the liberal philosophy that is often characteristic of people of high socio-economic status in Israel, such as the residents of the new settlements.

While the first sub-group expresses a general optimism, the second sub-group is an indication of a less clear situation. It may probably be considered as an expression of the tension between the settlers’ liberal attitudes and the ethnocentric foundation of many Jewish attitudes towards Arabs in Israel (see: Smoocha, 1987). The responses to statement 4 exhibit unawareness of the extent of the land problem within Misgav (which includes within its boundaries large tracts of Arab-owned land, against the will of land owners). Responses to statement 5 show an evenly split Jewish perception of the fast spatial expansion of the Arab

Table 3. Attitudes towards Arab-Jewish key issues in the Galilee (%)

Statement	Agree	No opinion	Disagree
(1) The joint residence of Arabs and Jews in the region causes friction which increases the tension between the two groups	6.8	13.0	80.2
(2) Problems associated with close proximity to Arab villages may cause some families to leave your settlement	5.3	6.1	88.6
(3) The Intifada has increased the tension between Arabs and Jews in the Galilee	19.8	7.6	72.6
(4) The existence of large tracts of Arab-owned land within Misgav's boundaries creates Arab-Jewish tension in the Galilee	24.3	31.8	44.0
(5) Most residents of the new villages are worried about the continuing expansion of the Arab villages	30.3	33.3	36.4
(6) The establishment of the new villages has contributed to the political moderation of the Galilee Arabs	24.2	41.7	34.1
(7) Following the establishment of the new villages, the danger of the Galilee Arabs seceding from Israel has decreased significantly	29.5	39.4	31.1
(8) External political events influence Arab-Jewish relations in the Galilee	48.9	10.5	40.6
(9) If a Palestinian state is established in the occupied territories, Arab-Jewish relations in the Galilee will improve	31.0	39.4	29.6
(10) There is still a pronounced deprivation of Arabs in the Galilee as compared to Jews, in terms of their living standards	69.7	9.8	20.5
(11) It is important that Galilee Arabs are appropriately represented in the authorities which decide on the region's future	78.9	9.0	12.1
(12) Following the development of the Galilee during the last decade, there are many more employment opportunities for the region's Arabs	89.2	6.2	4.7

villages around them, with only 36.4% 'not worried' about the situation. Reactions to statements 6 and 7 show that most of the respondents are far from being sure that the establishment of the new settlements has 'solved' the problem of Arab political mobilization in the Galilee. Most noticeably, statement 7 reveals that a considerable share of settlers (31.1%) feel the new settlements have not assisted in preventing the possibility of Arab-Palestinian secessionism in the region, which was the main geo-political reason for building the new Jewish settlements. Reactions to statement 9 show that the respondents are split about the expected positive impact of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories on Arab-Jewish relations in the Galilee.

The reader might have noted the high rate of 'no opinion' responses in the second sub-group of statements, ranging between 32-42% of the answers. We suggest here that

although some people may genuinely not have full knowledge on these topics, many others have refrained from voicing an opinion on these questions because of two main reasons: (a) people often tend to avoid relating to difficult issues, preferring to remain ambiguous for as long as possible; and (b) avoiding to commit an opinion on some of these issues exposes the tensions and contradictions between their liberal middle-class views about the future of the Galilee (a belief in good neighbourliness supported by economic growth that brings about benefits for all) and the reality they experience in their daily life.

In light of the general optimistic approach, and in spite of being uncertain about several aspects of the current situation, most of the respondents seem to know the ways—economic and political—to overcome the difficulties they see. About 90% of them expressed their belief that the development of the new settlements has benefited the Arabs in the region, at least by improving their employment opportunities; but nevertheless, a clear majority of 70% know that “there is still a pronounced deprivation of Arabs in the Galilee as compared to Jews”. Hence, they support additional economic development for Jews and Arabs and—may be most important—close to 80% of the interviewees, support the statement that “it is important that Galilee Arabs are appropriately represented in the authorities which decide on the future of the region”.

In summary, the attitudes of Misgav residents on key regional issues pertaining to Jewish–Arab relationships indicate selective ethnocentrism, on the one hand, and willingness to get closer to their Arab neighbours and support improvements in the standard of living and the political representations of Galilee Arabs, on the other. With this in mind, we shall move in the next two sections to compare the attitudes of the settlers in the new settlements in the Galilee with those of the general Jewish population in Israel, and with those of their Arab Galilee neighbours.

7. Comparative Analysis

7.1 Attitudes of Galilee Settlers and of Jews in Israel

We included in our survey several questions identical to those asked at Smooha’s nation-wide survey conducted among the Jewish public in Israel in 1988 (Smooha, 1989, 1992). Smooha’s survey addressed a sample of 1200 Jews and targeted only residents of Israeli cities, not including any settlers of the countryside.

Table 4. Willingness for personal contact with Arab* (%)

	New settlements	Jewish public
Employed by same organization	78.6	52.3
Joint party membership	75.4	66.6
Permanent friendship	50.8	38.4
Employed under Arab supervisor	50.0	34.2
Joint schooling of children	41.1	25.0
Reside in same neighbourhood	13.0	24.6
Marriage of my child	5.2	3.1

*There were three alternative responses to each questions: ‘ready’, ‘ready in certain circumstances’, ‘not ready’; the percentages in the table include those who selected ‘ready’.

Table 4 compares the willingness to have a personal contact with Arabs among Jewish population in Israel in general, as indicated by the above-mentioned national sample, and our sample of residents of the new settlements. We find that in all but one category, the residents of the new settlements are more willing to have personal contact with Arabs, most noticeably in the areas of joint employment and permanent friendship. The only result which contradicts this trend is the relatively low willingness to have Arabs living in their neighbourhood (that is, their settlement). This relates to the factor highlighted earlier, of internal migration to the new settlements as motivated first and foremost by the desire for living in a unique kind of settlement, tailored by the specific preferences of the specific group of settlers, ideologically, socially and aesthetically (see the concept of tailor-made communities in Carmon, 1994); the clear outcome was segregated homogeneous settlements. This one item that expresses a desire for segregation (that was aided by the institutional setting of the Israeli planning system which—throughout the history of rural Jewish settlement in Israel—has enabled residents to screen potential in-comers), does not obscure the relative moderation of the respondents on issues of inter-ethnic contact.

The difference in attitudes towards Arabs between the general Jewish population and the residents of the new Galilee settlements is even more pronounced when policy issues are examined. Table 5 shows that support for hard-line policy options towards the Arabs, such as increasing surveillance and securing Jewish control, is far lower among the residents of the new settlements. Special notice is due to the strong support (74%) for Arab-Jewish equalization of living conditions and—may be more important because far less acceptable by the general public—same support for integration of Arabs into state institutions. Even for granting the Arabs a status of a national minority within the Israeli state (a very controversial suggestion which runs counter to the policies of all Jewish parties), there is some support in the new settlements.

Table 6 presents people's opinions about the most appropriate 'arrangements' for the Arabs in Israel. Here too, the respondents in the new settlements display far more accommodating attitudes towards the Arabs, with only 1.6% supporting an arrangement which would cause them to leave the state, as opposed to 20.4% among the general Jewish public; and 57.1% supporting the recognition of the Arabs as a national minority with equal individual rights, as opposed to only 24.2% among the general public. However, here too there is one item which contradicts the picture of moderation, with residents of the new settlements giving very low support to the idea of autonomous Arab cantons in Israel (0.8%), with higher support to this idea among the Jewish public (5.1%). This relates to the fact that if such cantons are

Table 5. Support of policy measures* (%)

	New settlements	Jewish public
Secure the continuing control of Jews over the state's public resources	78.6	52.3
Continue existing policy towards the Arabs in Israel	37.6	33.3
Equalize living conditions and integrate Arabs into state institutions	73.8	19.8
Increase surveillance over the Arabs	8.9	52.7
Grant the Arabs the status of a national minority (with some separate institutions and autonomy)	8.7	2.6

*There were three alternative responses to each question: 'in favour', 'with restrictions', 'against'; the percentages in the table include those who selected 'in favour'.

Table 6. Support for the most appropriate 'arrangements' for the Arabs in Israel (%)

	New settlements	Jewish public
Causing them to live outside of Israel	1.6	20.4
They should live in Israel, but accept the Jewish character of the state and their status as a non-Jewish minority	27.0	25.6
They should live in Israel as a national minority with equal individual rights	57.1	24.2
They should live in separate cantons with some autonomy	0.8	5.1
They should be equal rights citizens in a secular state	0.8	1.8
Other	12.7	22.7
Total	100.0	100.0

ever seriously mooted, the central Galilee region will be one of the first locations to be considered, given its large Arab majority (about 75% Arabs and only 25% Jewish). The low support of this arrangement among our respondents exposes once again the inherent tension between their generally moderate and liberal outlook, and the geo-political context in which they live.

Further evidence of the relative moderation of the residents of the new settlements can be found in Table 7 on a range of Arab-Jewish issues. It can be shown that in every category

Table 7. Attitudes of Jews towards the Arabs in Israel (%)

	New settlements	Jewish public
The Arabs have the right for full civil equality in Israel	84.2	25.5
Israeli Arabs can be equal citizens in Israel and identify with the state	69.3	37.8
The large majority of Israeli Arabs recognizes Israel's right to exist as the state of the Jews	65.8	33.4
An Israeli Arab has a good chance to fulfil his/her professional ambitions in Israel	43.8	68.3
The state of Israel is the homeland not only of the Jews but also of the Arabs	36.5	23.6
The Arab language should have equal status to Hebrew in state organizations	32.5	20.1
A peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians should also resolve the land conflict between the Israeli state and Israeli Arabs	29.0	15.6
Israeli Arabs pose a security risk for the state	20.9	42.1
It is impossible to trust Israeli Arabs	19.0	59.8
Israel does enough for its Arab citizens	14.7	59.2

*Percentage of those who 'fully agree' and 'agree'.

members of this group are more positive towards the Arabs than the general Jewish public: 84% of them support granting Arabs full civil equality in Israel, as compared with only 25.5% of the general Jewish public, more of them support the official use of the Arabic language and the resolution of land conflicts (of which many are still unresolved in the Galilee), and they are more critical about the Arabs' lack of equality and opportunity in the state of Israel to date. The images and belief system of the Jewish new settlers of the Galilee as regards the Arabs are also more accommodating and positive than the rest of the Jewish public, with examples such as a much firmer readiness to trust the minority and less concern about them constituting a security risk.

Because moderate attitudes were found where high proximity and relatively frequent contacts of residents of the new settlements with Galilee Arabs was evident, causal relationships may be hypothesized, i.e. the more frequent contact that the new Jewish settlers in the Galilee are having with Arabs, compared to Jews elsewhere in the country, have moderated their attitudes towards Arabs. While, as noted above, the degree of Jewish-Arab contact in the Galilee is not high, it is significantly higher than contact between the two ethnic groups in most other places in Israel (the only similar closeness of Arab-Jewish contact to the ones recorded in the Galilee, can be found in the few mixed Jewish-Arab towns and cities; see: Deutch & Kahat, 1986; Gonen & Hadas, 1994; Romann & Weingrod, 1991). To illustrate, Smooha (1992, p. 85) found that 90% of the general Jewish public in Israel had never visited Arab homes, as compared with only 53% of the residents of the new settlements interviewed for our survey (Table 1). Other forms of Jewish-Arab contact (such as joint employment, commerce) in the Galilee have been shown in our survey to be consistently higher than contact in the rest of the country.

One way to investigate the hypothesized causal relationships is to control statistically expected intervening variables, particularly demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Our ability to do so for the comparison between ours and Smooha's (national) surveys was limited by different types of databases. However, because we had a collection of similar questions, we designed a way to do this by constructing a typology of 'orientation types' in a very similar way to the method used by Smooha (1992, p. 86). This typology was based on the accumulation of successive pre-determined attitudes in at least four of six given questions about key Arab-Jewish issues. This enabled us to divide the residents of the new settlements to 'conciliationists', 'pragmatists' and 'hard-liners' (Smooha's fourth type—'exclusionists'—was not found in our sample).

The comparison of this index of 'orientation type' showed that among the residents of the new settlements a high 54.2% were 'conciliationists' as opposed to 19.4% among the Jewish public. The classification was controlled for three social variables in which the population of the new settlements differs from the general Jewish population: age, ethnic origin and education. As noted earlier, the new settlers in the Galilee are characterized by being young, highly educated Ashkenazi. Following Smooha's method we isolated the most accommodating orientation type—the 'conciliationist'—and cross-tabulated it with the three key demographic characteristics.

Table 8 shows that the social background of respondents is related to the formation of attitudes towards Arab-Jewish issues among Jews in Israel. The column under the Jewish public heading clearly shows that the 'consolationist type' is much more common among those from European and American origin (i.e. Ashkenazim, who were compared to Jews from Asian and African origin) and those who have higher than secondary education; the broad category of age—26-55—does not explain the differences in attitudes. However, if it was only for these two characteristic—Ashkenazi origin and higher education that characterize the new settlers in the Galilee—we would expect to have about a third of the respondents in the category of 'consolationist type'. According to the findings of our survey, more than half

Table 8. Orientation type by socio-demographic characteristics of settlers in the new villages and the general Jewish public

Category	Cons. in new settlements (%)	Cons. in Jewish public (%)
Total samples	54.2 ^a	19.4
Age brackets 26–55	58.1 ^a	17.3
Years education 13 +	57.1 ^a	32.3
Ashkenazi ^b	56.8 ^a	35.4

Key: Cons. = consiliatationist type; ^asignificant at 0.01; ^bparents born in Europe or America.

of them are in this category. A large share of the 20% difference (between the expected third and the finding of 54%) can probably be attributed to the proximity to Arabs. Hence, our general conclusion is that living in the mixed region of the Galilee has moderated the attitudes of the settlers of the new settlements towards Arabs of the Galilee and Arabs in Israel in general.

These results represent a one-sided perspective—the Jewish perspective. To complete the picture of attitudinal formation in a mixed region, we need to compare the corresponding attitudes of the other ethnic group, namely the Arabs.

7.2 Attitudes of Jewish and Arab Leaders

Our survey of residents of the new settlements in Misgav included 48 respondents who may be defined as 'local leaders', i.e. members of village committees or Misgav council assembly (see earlier for the description of our sample). In order to facilitate a comparison of Jewish and Arab attitudes, our questionnaire included several statements identical to the ones used by Yiftachel and Law Yone in their 1989 survey of Arab leaders of the central and upper Galilee (Yiftachel & Law Yone, 1995). This survey reached 113 Arab councillors in nine local authorities bordering Misgav, and in three Arab local authorities located further north in Upper Galilee. Because Israel's settlement and planning policies and the phenomenon of new settlements has been similar in the Central and Upper Galilee, the two surveys are close enough in area, content, and context to enable a useful analytical comparison.

Table 9 summarizes the responses of Arab and Jewish local leaders to several statements about key issues in the Galilee. It shows that on each topic the Jewish leaders are more positive and optimistic about the evolution of relationships in the Galilee than their Arab counterparts. This difference holds throughout the comparison of attitudes in the economic, territorial, social and political domains. A majority of both Arab and Jewish leaders supported the statement that the establishment of the new settlements had emphasized the inequality between the two groups, but the Arab majority was much larger (86%) than the Jewish (54%). Twice as many Jews, compared to Arabs, agreed that 'many new friendships' had developed between Arabs and Jews in the region. As for economic aspects, statements regarding inter-ethnic cooperation and benefits that went to Arab villages following the establishment of the new settlements were supported by Jewish leaders in proportions 2–4 times higher than by Arab leaders. The same trend prevails for territorial issues (second and third statements); Jewish leaders tend to present a rosier picture than Arab respondents.

The data in Table 9 indicate that attitudes in the Galilee are influenced not only by socio-economic and spatial factors, but are also strongly linked to the ethnic affiliation of the

Table 9. Attitudes of Arab and Jewish local leaders in the Galilee

Statement	Support among Jewish leaders (%)	Support among Arab leaders (%)
Social, political and territorial aspects		
The establishment of the new villages demonstrated clearly the inequality between Arabs and Jews in the Galilee	54	86
The establishment of the new villages caused the Arabs in the Galilee to be more determined to hold on to their land	58	86
Since the establishment of Misgav, the Arabs have increased their demand for municipal expansion	24	57
Since the establishment of the new villages, many Arab-Jewish friendships have developed in the Galilee	46	27
The unauthorized building in the Arab villages is the fault of the Arabs and does not indicate planning neglect by government authorities	16	10
Economic aspects		
Following the establishment of the new villages, Arab-Jewish economic cooperation has increased in the Galilee	68	31
The establishment of the new villages improved the economic situation of many businesses in Arab villages	76	13
Following the establishment of the new villages, Arab land prices have increased	32	25

respondents. Jews in the region are consistently and significantly more optimistic about the consequences and benefits of the establishment of the new Jewish settlements, not only for Jews but also for the Arab residents of the Galilee.

8. Summary and Conclusions

8.1 The Galilee Region

The analysis of our findings taught us that the combination of spatial mix and the specific social characteristics of the Jewish settlers in the Galilee have influenced the shaping of relatively moderate attitudes towards Arabs in general and towards key Jewish-Arab issues in the Galilee in particular. Most of the new Jewish settlers admit that there is inequality between Arabs and Jews in the Galilee (86%) and support the statement that “the Arabs have the right for full civil equality in Israel” (84%). A majority is in favour of economic cooperation, and many support common action in municipal services and even in cultural and educational activities. Moreover, a large majority (79%) states that Arabs should be “appropriately

represented in the authorities which decide on the future of the region". We found that most of the new Jewish settlers of the Galilee (74%) support several main current requests of the Arab citizens of Israel, i.e. "equal living conditions and integration into state institutions".

However, previous studies (Falah, 1989; Yiftachel & Law Yone, 1995) showed that Arab attitudes were quite negative toward Jewish settlement in the Galilee, and particularly toward the new settlements. Some of their findings pointed that the nearer an Arab village was to a Jewish community, the more negative the attitudes of its elected Arab leaders were towards Jewish settlement in the region.

Should we conclude that this is another one of the cases in which the penetrating group, who voluntarily entered the area, is satisfied with its new place and accepts its neighbours, while the incumbent residents are highly dissatisfied with the unexpected invasion and rejects the new spatial order? This may well be the case, but because the Arab data were collected in 1989 and the Jewish data in 1994, and because important relevant changes have taken place in these few years, reaching such a conclusion may require another round of questioning the local Arabs.

The Arab citizens of Israel (15% of the total population and 75% in central Galilee) have had in recent years two main causes for their political struggle: on the one hand, they fought for more equality between Jews and Arabs within Israel; on the other hand, against the Israeli policy in the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza. These two issues have gone through notable changes since 1993. First, an Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation process has begun and several agreements have already been signed. Second, the 1992-1996 Labour government has significantly increased the resources channelled to the Arab sector, mainly to its educational institutions and its municipal services, and to some extent also cared for additional power resources to the Arab population, including affirmative action policy in several governmental offices.

The current situation is still very far from equality. However, considering the changes that have already occurred, and adding to it the fact that most of the new Jewish settlers support—at least verbally—some claims of the Arabs, there might have been a change for the better in the Arabs' attitudes as well. If the Israeli government complies with what seems to be common requirements for more equality of Jews and Arabs in the area, if it refrains from additional land confiscation and supports the beginnings of cooperation—there is hope. The ethnocentrism of both groups will probably continue to dominate much of their actions, but there is a chance for an increase of mutual trust, some cooperation, and gradual development of common interests. Studies of mixed regions have found that over time, some (but of course not all) ethnically mixed regions develop common interests, which may lead to activities aimed at inclusive regional resource mobilization. This could lead to the emergence of territorial, multi-ethnic regionalism, especially in regions facing strong centralized governments (see Gradus, 1988; Markusen, 1987; Mikessel & Murphy, 1991).

8.2 Socio-spatial Mix and Inter-ethnic Relations

Our findings provide some support to normative planning theories which advocate the usefulness of socio-spatial mix in moderating inter-group attitudes and softening hostilities (Sarkissian *et al.*, 1990). However, as former empirical research has taught us, the success of a spatial mix in improving inter-ethnic relations depends on the characteristics of the involved populations and those of the environment in which the mix takes place, as well as on the dynamics of the process.

On the face of it, the case we analyzed had all the odds against it: different ethnic origin, different religion, very different socio-economic status, without any moderating common denominator, as required by the conclusions of the contact hypothesis. Moreover, the

migration of Jews into the region was forced on the incumbent Arab residents, and therefore, almost by definition, gained negative attitudes towards it.

Nevertheless, the spatial proximity had a positive influence on the inter-ethnic attitudes of one group—the Jews (who elsewhere tend to be highly prejudiced against the Arabs—see Smootha, 1987) and a certain positive impact on its behaviour. There is some chance that under the changing conditions, it might have had some positive influence of the Arabs as well. We believe that lessons can be taken from this case to be implemented by planners and form the subject of further research. While we acknowledge the differences between the regional scale of our study, and most other (and smaller) arenas of inter-ethnic mix, we contend that the Galilee region—mainly because of its relatively small size—can provide useful lessons for other cases of ethnic mix.

The most important lesson is related to the scale of the area in which the mix takes place. Almost all the previous research related to small geographic scales, to housing projects and neighbourhoods. The common objective was SIP—stable integrative process—(DeMarco & Galster, 1993) and stable integrated neighbourhoods, even though many studies put a question mark on its feasibility, in light of the common trends of migration behaviour (Clark, 1993). Some 20 years ago, based on Israeli experience, we pointed at the desirability of spatial mix of homogeneous ethnic clusters in larger urban areas (Carmon, 1976). Based on the current case, it seems advisable to repeat the same suggestion, while noting the following: where deep differences exist between the two groups, and where the majority of both groups reject the idea of living together (as is clearly the case between Jews and Arabs in Israel), the goals of more equality and less inter-ethnic hostility and friction have reasonable chances of being achieved if the groups live side by side—in a city or in a region—in homogeneous clusters, but with some joint economic, municipal and perhaps even social facilities.

Other lessons are related to the *dynamics* of the process, and more specifically to a group penetration process. The frequent case is that a low-status group penetrates a higher-status area, causing a reduction in local property value that fosters common prejudice; the negative consequences of this process intensify with the size of the penetrating group. In our case, the Jewish penetrating group was small in comparison to the local Arab group and was of higher status. Adding this case to what former studies tell, led us to offer four explaining factors that are detailed below.

First, we venture to offer the *penetrating group phenomenon* as an explanation of positive attitudinal change. This factor—according to our understanding—explains the findings of other studies on key meeting places in Israel's inter-ethnic landscape. It holds true for both Arab and Jewish 'penetrating' groups in Israel. For example, Deutch and Kahat (1986), Gonen and Hadas (1994) and Rabinowitz (1992, 1994) found that Arabs who had moved into Jewish parts of Acre, Jaffa, and Nazareth, respectively, held moderate and accommodating attitudes towards coexistence with their new Jewish neighbours. Newman (1989) found that Jewish settlers in the West Bank and the Golan Heights were often optimistic about the possibility of harmonious Arab-Jewish coexistence.

Second is the absence of residential displacement which is critical in preventing negative results. From several points of view, the process we studied is similar to processes of urban gentrification that in many cases involved involuntary displacement of incumbent lower-status residents (Hartman, 1979; Marcuse, 1993; Schill & Nathan, 1983). However, as detailed above, the establishment of the new local council of Misgav involved the inclusion of Arab land within the borders of Jewish-ruled council (without changing ownership), although there were hardly any cases of direct or indirect residential displacement of Arabs. This somewhat resembles a situation of gentrification in an area in which the incumbent residents own their dwelling units.

Third, the size of the penetrating group seems to be an important factor; if it is small in

comparison to the number of the incumbent residents, the prospects of success are higher. Last, but not least, is the socio-economic status of the penetrating group in comparison to the locals; because higher-status groups tend to be more deeply prejudiced against the lower ones than vice-versa, whenever they experience 'the penetrating group phenomenon', the positive change of attitudes is more intense (Carmon & Mannheim, 1979). Also, where a higher-status group enters, it frequently brings about economic benefits to many in the area. If the housing market was one market for Jews and Arabs in the Galilee region, the Arabs would have benefited a lot from rising values of their real estate, but because the market was strictly divided, this hardly happened. Nevertheless, there were significant economic benefits, in the form of highly improved regional roads and additional job opportunities, that were utilized mostly by the Jews but to a significant extent also by Arabs.

Needless to say, all these factors should be repeatedly tested by researchers in various social circumstances, in order to verify their explanatory power. Meanwhile, planners can use their commonsense to select from this available knowledge principles of planning, which can assist in promoting the goals of enhanced access to resources and improved inter-ethnic relations. Many of the variables that influence the attainment of these goals are not (or are hardly) tractable by planners. Socio-spatial mix, including the geographic scale of the area in which the mix takes place and some other characteristics of the penetrating process, are among the few partly tractable variables; therefore, it is highly beneficial to enrich the knowledge of planners about the behaviour of these variables under different circumstances, and to advise them to use it as part of their efforts to build a more peaceful world.

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Notes

1. The terminology of describing the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel has been subject to continuous debate in recent years. We wish to clarify that our use of the term 'Arabs' (in the Galilee or in Israel) is interchangeable with 'Palestinians'. We use the former because most Arabs in the region prefer to use it, and we see the latter as equally legitimate.
2. The use of terminology, such as 'black', 'white' and 'race', does not indicate any essentialist leaning among the authors. We share the view that these terms derive from social constructions and treat them as such throughout the paper.
3. In that context, it should be mentioned that the first five names in the list of sample locations are 'communal settlements' (that is, ex-urban settlements, with a loose communal organizational structure, but with a totally private property and consumption regime). Ya'ad and Manof recently became 'communal settlements', after previously being 'moshavim' (settlements with more collective communal structures), while Tuval is a kibbutz (a settlement with a communal organizational structure, where all means of production and capital are communally owned).

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