

Evaluation Methods for Urban and Regional Plans

Essays in Memory of Morris (Moshe) Hill

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Integrated Evaluation of Israel's Neighborhood Revitalization Project

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Project Renewal is Israel's national program for the social and physical rehabilitation of distressed neighborhoods. Between 1979 (the year it started operating at full steam) and 1985, a sum equivalent to some 600 million US dollars was spent on its programs. The project began with 30 neighborhoods and gradually grew to include 84 distressed areas, with 600,000 inhabitants (about 15% of the population of Israel).

The formulators of Israel's Project Renewal tried to apply some of the lessons learned from previous neighborhood renewal programs, in particular the American ones. They were aware of the public and professional critique of urban renewal (Anderson, 1964; Gans, 1965), of Model Cities (Frieden and Kaplan, 1975) and of the Community Development Block Grants (McFarland, 1977). On the basis of these lessons, decisions were made to give higher priority to social-urban goals than to economic-urban goals. As a consequence, only residential areas (not commercial or others) were selected for the Project; some central city locations were excluded. In order to avoid heavy social costs, such as the kind imposed by urban renewal, the Project's basic guideline of operation was rehabilitation without relocation of residents and without demolition of buildings. The 'New Federalism' concept of the Community Development Block Grants was not accepted by the Israelis, who preferred the Model Cities ideas, some of which were more in line with their own former approaches to the problems of disadvantaged populations. Hence, other guidelines formulated for Project Renewal were as follows: to combine physical and social rehabilitation; to target public assistance by area need, thus making all the residents of a designated neighborhood eligible; and last—an unusual principle in the centralized governmental system of Israel—to encourage decentralization and citizen participation in planning and implementation (Carmon and Hill, 1984).

The Method of Integrated Evaluation

Traditional evaluation research has been on the scene for several decades. During this period, it has found a home in several behavioral sciences, especially in sociology, psychology, and

education; has developed an impressive methodology; and has been applied to a wide range of social programs. In recent years, however, evaluation research has been faced with a growing wave of criticism.

Many of the problems with traditional evaluation research arise from its single-vision focus on the assessment of outcomes, while ignoring the process that produced them. In order to assess an 'outcome', one usually assumes that it pertains to a pre-stated, fixed goal. One must also be sure that it is a product of the program; i.e., the tough question of causal relations must be solved. This has been taken to mean that the research enterprise should focus only on a few narrow questions that are amenable to experimental and statistical analysis. As a consequence, this approach has been criticized for being oblivious to the needs of the decision-makers; for taking too long and costing too much (Wholey, 1979); for ignoring the goals of anyone (such as recipient groups) other than the legislators and high-level officials (House, 1980); for assuming a set of fixed goals that in practice soon drift along and become remolded (Kress *et al.*, 1981); for possibly ignoring important happenings in the field while being busy with sophisticated (and costly) testing; and for neglecting the use of social theory (Chen and Rossi, 1980).

These criticisms are especially cogent in the case of Project Renewal. For a broad-aim program whose main thrust was to provide an organizational canopy for a large number of diverse programs in several fields, the application of traditional evaluation methods would have necessarily meant the adoption of one of two unsatisfactory approaches: either a need to 'go micro' and focus on a few selected programs in a cross-neighborhood analysis (to make life difficult, the programs are not replicated as a package from one neighborhood to another); or a need to 'go macro' and compare neighborhoods by means of a few indicators. The latter would mean ignoring the process of how the program has operated, and thus forfeiting the opportunity to draw operational conclusions from the results.

A different approach—process evaluation—has been gradually shaped in recent years. This approach is more utilization-focused, sometimes with shortcuts and qualitative analysis of outcomes preferred over costly methods that might take a very long time to yield results (Wholey, 1979; Patton, 1978; Madsen, 1983). Process evaluation tackles the hard question of determining the causal link by arguing that traditional evaluation research has been oblivious to the implementation process, viewing it as a 'black box' that is of interest only in its outputs. Rather than relying solely on a sophisticated research design to bridge the long span between planning intent and outcomes, process evaluation opts for a 'close-causation' approach (Thomas, 1981) that focuses on the series of steps

leading to outcomes. It often relies on qualitative, non-experimental approaches to measuring outcomes.

Yet the methodology of process evaluation has often been intuitive, yielding an avalanche of descriptive data of the 'who said what to whom' genre. A more analytic methodology can be found in the adjacent—yet separate—field of implementation analysis (summed up in Sabatier, 1986). The latter, however, has largely been incognizant of its affinity to evaluation research and its capacity to step in and fill the methodological gap by systematically lighting up the black box of the implementation process (Alterman, 1982; 1983).

The integrated evaluation approach (Alterman *et al.*, 1984) seeks to create a synthesis of several evaluation traditions so as to enable a comprehensive, decision-oriented evaluation with a multi-group perspective. To do that, it draws not only from the two approaches discussed so far—outcome evaluation with a softened methodology, and process evaluation reinforced by implementation analysis—but also from three other approaches long utilized in other fields and too infrequently absorbed into evaluation research of social programs. These are monitoring, cost-effectiveness analysis, and multi-group goals-achievement evaluation.

Monitoring is addressed to measuring the outputs delivered and the populations benefitted. It is a somewhat mundane, yet necessary, approach commonly utilized by managers and valued by decision-makers and politicians. The second of these other approaches, analysis of cost-effectiveness, is commonly undertaken by economists and policy-analysts. If not totally absent from the evaluation of social policies, it is usually commissioned separately.

The concept of multi-group evaluation was developed by Morris Hill (1968; 1973). The method has been elaborated further by several authors for application in a variety of areas, and has been applied in several countries. It calls for a more humanistic approach to evaluation: rather than measuring goals-achievement solely from the perspective of the formal goals articulated by the legislators and decision-makers, it enables the assessment of impacts from the points of view of the various client groups to be affected. Originally, this method was proposed for the *ex ante* evaluation of proposed policies. In that case, it deals with hypothesized effects and could handle a large number of groups; it also has a weighting system representing the relative importance of the goals and effects for each group.

For the present research, a simplified version of the multi-group evaluation method has been adapted to *ex post* evaluation. The integrated approach as applied in the comprehensive evaluation of Project Renewal include the six following components:

1. **Evaluation of the implementation process:** To what extent have the operational principles of the project been met through the institutions created and the decisions made? The approach adopted is a 'bottom up' analysis of the implementation process (Sabatier, 1986), as seen from the 'receiving end' of the project neighborhoods. Wherever possible, the multi-group perspective is applied to an assessment of the operational principles in order to reflect the views of the residents, local governments, and central government officials.
2. **Evaluation of citizen participation:** Citizen participation has been singled out as a separate component both because of its importance and prominence in Project Renewal and because of its special nature as both a substantive goal and a method of operation, which have necessitated a hybrid approach combining process evaluation with evaluation of outcomes. This component, too, takes a multi-group perspective of the results of participation.
3. **Monitoring of outputs:** What programs have been delivered, in what amounts (discounting 'program displacement'), and which populations have benefitted?
4. **Economic evaluation:** What has been the effectiveness of the programs delivered relative to their costs, and what have been the distributive economic implications for the populations that have benefitted?
5. **Evaluation of outcomes:** What have been the outcomes attributable to the Project in terms of physical and social changes in the neighborhoods? The evaluation has adopted a combined qualitative and quantitative, non-experimental approach that tackles the problem of causal attribution in three ways: by establishing a 'base line' documenting each neighborhood's problems prior to the advent of the Project; by posing the question of causal attribution to reliable informants in each neighborhood; and by relying on the information supplied on the implementation process and the monitoring of outputs, both of which are designed to de-mystify the problem of causal linking through exposure of the decision-making process.
6. **Goals-achievement evaluation:** To what extent has the Project achieved its declared goals? To what extent have the outcomes supported unplanned or unarticulated goals? And from a multi-

group perspective, which of the goals of interest groups have been furthered?

The research team that developed the integrated evaluation method was invited to conduct a comprehensive evaluation study of Project Renewal. The team worked under the auspices of the Samuel Neaman Institute for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology. Four years were devoted to a study of ten neighborhoods carefully selected from among the seventy in which the Project was active when the research was begun in 1982. A variety of research methods and tools were used: semi-structured and structured interviews with local informants, both public officials and active residents; participant observations; analysis of available documents; and a household survey of a representative sample of 150 residents in each of the ten neighborhoods. Inferences regarding the Project's impacts were based partly on longitudinal data analysis and partly on personal evaluations of reliable local informants with whom the field researchers had contact throughout the years of data collection in the ten neighborhoods. During the study period, ongoing contact was maintained with central agency policy-makers. The information emerging from the evaluation was supplied through partial drafts, informal discussions, and formal presentations.

Limitations of space allow only a partial presentation of the findings of four of the six components of the integrated evaluation of Project Renewal.

Evaluation of the Implementation Process

Successful implementation was defined as the degree to which six special operational principles of Project Renewal were fulfilled.

1. **Implementation through reliance on existing agencies for service delivery**
Hoping to avoid costly replication, Project Renewal had as its declared intention the reliance on existing offices for service delivery and the addition of only a modest superstructure for planning, coordination, and evaluation. In practice, observance of this principle meant service delivery through five or six major government and quasi-government offices, each with many regional offices and only a modestly powerful coordinator to orchestrate among them. In addition, this principle raised problems of allegiance and subordination.

Had these problems with the institutional structure gone unmitigated, it is doubtful whether the Project would have succeeded in implementing as much as it has. Happily, there were forces that provided some remedy to compensate for the friction in the institutional machinery. The *sine qua non* for successful implementation—commitment (Bardach, 1977; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1981)—was available in large doses among the higher-level decision-makers, who apparently succeeded in instilling this quality in many field personnel, as well. Furthermore, the Project's unique structure of twinning neighborhoods with well-off Jewish communities abroad provided a source of 'watchdogs' to oversee implementation at both the central and local levels.

2. Decentralization of authority to the neighborhood level

One of the major innovations introduced by Project Renewal was the delegation of responsibility for decision-making to newly established Neighborhood Steering Committees. This principle was fulfilled only partially and required compromises, expressed in the very structure of these committees: only half of the 22 committee members were resident representatives, the other half consisted of representatives of the various local and central government offices involved in Project Renewal. Furthermore, the way in which decentralization was implemented indicated that the delegation of authority was viewed as being limited to determining the desired programs (planning decisions); the neighborhood that misinterpreted decentralization to apply to possessing power over budgets and service delivery, as well, had a rude awakening. These decisions were to remain with the central authorities.

Still, one must conclude that relative to the base-line from which decentralization started, Israel's highly centralized mode of government operations, decentralization of Project Renewal was a relative success. This conclusion is supported by evidence of difficulties encountered in decentralization in other countries (Alterman, 1988).

3. Maintaining good relations with local governments

Aware of the lesson from American neighborhood programs, that poor relations with the local government can become a major pitfall, Project Renewal officially declared its intention to secure the goodwill of local governments, on which the Project depended for delivering some of its programs. Yet a look at the Project's institutional structure indicates that, ostensibly, local

authorities had little to gain. They had representation on Neighborhood Steering Committees; otherwise, decentralization Project Renewal-style called for bypassing local governments. By turning local authorities into service delivery agents without much authority, and by introducing more central involvement in several areas that previously were fully under local control (but with tight budgets), the Project was in danger of further weakening Israel's already-feeble local government structure.

The real test, however, was in the balance of interests created for local governments. On balance, the score was positive. The best indicator is the strong pressure placed by local authorities wishing to be included in the Project, and the rarity of cases in which they wished to be excluded. The opportunity to have more budgets pass through their coffers, enabling some funds from existing services to be freed (contrary to declared Project policy), and the possibility of showing politically marketable improvements in the community were apparently ample compensation.

4. Creating an effective neighborhood planning process for designing a package of programs

Any chance of meeting the Project's goals hinged on the success in finding a suitable strategy for tackling each neighborhood's particular problems. Undaunted by the possibility that these might be 'wicked problems' eluding solution (Rittel and Webber, 1972; Cartwright, 1973), the Project assigned the planning task to each local Steering Committee. Comparison of the package of programs requested by each neighborhood with its major problem indicated that the majority of programs did address existing problems in the areas of housing quality, infrastructure improvement, community organization, and educational enrichment. Some programs, however, dealt with the 'cosmetics' of non-priority areas or with areas with unknown benefits. In the absence of employment-retraining or economic development as part of the Project at the time, few programs attempted to tackle the root economic problems of poverty.

The planning processes in the neighborhoods were lacking in many ways, but particularly in the following: a poor data base, a tendency to early closure of possibilities for adding programs, and a weak rational decision process. Yet they did succeed in institutionalizing a planning process at the neighborhood level for the first time in Israel's history.

5. **Adequate inter-office coordination to enable integrated action**

The Project's declared goal was to create an integrated program to tackle social, educational, health, and physical problems in a coordinated fashion, under the assumption that only a concerted onslaught could pull the neighborhoods out of decline. To meet this goal, Israeli government offices were expected to do the unprecedented—to coordinate their actions not simply through a one-time committee but on an ongoing basis. The Project, moreover, was to be on a large scale, encompassing more than 80 neighborhoods and covering most local authorities in the country. Of all the Project's operational principles, that of coordinated action was least met. Instead, in many of the neighborhoods the Project was not much more than concurrent action. The lack of coordination was more apparent between the two major demarcations—the social and the physical—than within these areas. Thus, coordination between social and educational programs was somewhat better, with notable attempts to create norms of cooperation in the field.

6. **Ensuring that Project Renewal adds to rather than substitutes for existing services**

To what extent did the Project actually add to existing services rather than simply change the budgetary address? Some programs—a significant minority—were found to have been simply transferred to Project auspices, thereby reducing its net output and potential impact. Contrary to popular impression, it was not only the local authorities that benefitted from such replacement, but central government ministries as well, which sought to free up regular budgets. On the positive side, the existence of substitution indicated that Project Renewal was perceived as a success and that it was worthwhile to jump on its bandwagon.

In general, the examination of the implementation process showed that Project Renewal's institutional structure and decision processes, although not free of shortcomings, operated well. When one considers the challenging task of installing such gear and the need for considerable innovation in the area of administrative behavior in which innovation is so difficult, the Project's implementation process may be termed a success story.

Resident Participation in the Project

Resident participation was defined in this study as existing when individuals who are not elected or appointed officials of agencies or of government take part in decision-making and/or implementation in the institutions and programs that affect them.

The stipulation set by Project Renewal that resident participation was to be one of the essential principles of the process was, for Israel, an unusual, innovative step. Israel has a very centralized system of government, in which the basic governmental attitude has been paternalistic; further, most immigrants to the country have come from countries with non-democratic regimes. Neither officials and professionals nor residents had had any significant amount of experience with participatory processes. Nevertheless, the centralized power structure was able to mandate a pattern of involvement, require a basic minimum of 50% resident representation on the Neighborhood Steering Committee, and enforce the stipulation. Indeed, in the research neighborhoods, the requirement was met on the whole, as was the recommendation that residents chair the sub-committees.

The minimum pattern set by the regulations, however, became the maximum pattern in most places, and other residents had almost no opportunity to take part in the decision-making process on the public level. The number of residents with such an opportunity ranged from 11–60. Clearly, the formal mandate institutionalizing resident participation was critical in ensuring that this involvement would ensue.

The nature of the residents' organization in Project Renewal shares many characteristics with neighborhood rehabilitation programs around the world (see Churchman, 1987, for a comparative survey). Neighborhood councils consisting solely of residents, but often aided and encouraged by professionals working for the Project, were the organizational focus of the residents. These councils usually consisted of residents who had been active in the neighborhood prior to the advent of the Project. Elections held to choose the residents' representatives were not always so successful, as levels of participation were not high: the range in the research neighborhoods was from 10%–25%. The heads of these councils often played a critical role, and tended to cling to power once it was attained. Interestingly, it was found that those councils formed after the Project began, for the purpose of working in the Project, tended to be more democratically run, more open to the involvement of other residents in the process and more independent in their activities.

Within the institutional framework of the Project, the most frequent pattern of relations between the residents and the

authorities took the form of negotiation, compromise, and mutual persuasion. The basic source of the residents' power position was the influence granted them by the authorities. Additional sources of power existed in some neighborhoods, however; among them were the residents' potential electoral power, their assumed potential for arousing or preventing agitation in the neighborhood, their ability to maneuver among the various authorities, and the personality of the council chair.

The residents' influence was expressed in varying degrees on a number of planes: definition of the neighborhood's problems, goals, and priorities; initiation of programs; support, modification, or rejection of the programs of the authorities; speed of program implementation; administrative procedures and the hiring of staff. There were some cases of open disputes between the residents and one or another of the authorities. On the whole, however, the residents tended to be impressed by the claims of professionalism made by the authorities and to accept their recommendations. Furthermore, there were limitations on the type and scope of decisions that could be made by residents. Nevertheless, our summary assessment of the balance of power between residents and authorities is that, on a grading scale of 1-13 (with 13 representing full resident control), most of the ten research neighborhoods fell in the 7-9 range; that is, from having some decision-making authority to full partnership.

This brief exposition has obviously not been able to present the richness and complexity of our data (Churchman, 1985). On the basis of those data, we have concluded that all of the possible goals of resident involvement were promoted to some extent, although not to the same extent or in the same manner in all neighborhoods. As mentioned, an important achievement of Project Renewal was the creation of a process that was unique in the State of Israel: public decision-making, in which rank-and-file residents are involved by right and in a proportion affording them some influence. Although this potential was not realized to its fullest extent, the very existence of such a possibility represents a considerable achievement and a revolutionary change.

Economic Aspects

The economic evaluation dealt with two principal aspects relevant to the proclaimed objectives of Project Renewal: (a) achieving objectives at least cost (i.e., economic efficiency considerations); and (b) attaining the highest possible levels of redistributive goals—specifically, improvement in the real income of the target population, given the resources allocated to the Project. This paper will dwell only on the second aspect.

The intervention of a public authority to improve income levels can take the form of direct financial assistance or in-kind transfers; for example, loans for renovations and expansion of housing, or various social services supplied directly to beneficiaries without charge or at subsidized prices. Given the nature of these programs, questions regarding the long-term effects of real income changes cannot be adequately addressed in the present context.

In order to ascertain the extent to which the benefits from the various Project activities, both physical and social, were equitably distributed, the following questions were addressed¹:

1. Were the benefits distributed among the various income groups in proportion to their share of the neighborhood population?
2. What was the ratio of benefits (measuring their monetized value on the basis of cost) to the average family income?²

Benefits from Physical and Social Improvements by Income Group

Although the various programs studied³, though generally entailing only nominal fees or provided free of charge, were open to all residents, the analysis indicated that rates of participation among the more well-established strata of neighborhood residents were often higher than among the economically and socially weaker groups. In some programs, however, the rate of participation was low for the neighborhood as a whole.

Specifically, the respondents in the household sample survey were asked: "In which areas has Project Renewal contributed to you and to your family?" The areas referred to by the question were: apartment expansion and renovation; renovation of building, stairway and surrounding grounds; financial aid to the family (loans, scholarships, assistance in day care or preschool tuition and the like); physical improvement of the neighborhood (lighting, public gardens, roads, and so forth); improvement in educational standards, and

1. The analysis in this section is partially based on the responses to a mid-1983 household survey that was conducted independently of the economic analysis in the ten research neighborhoods.
2. This question presented, of course, a common valuation problem that vexes most benefit-cost analysts. Often (as we did here), values are based on project inputs because outputs are difficult or even impossible to quantify. This implies - wrongly, of course - that the benefit-cost ratio necessarily equals 1. Given the nature of the social programs, on the one hand, and the size of the research budget for the economic analysis, on the other hand, we were not able to value Project outputs, or benefits, through direct questions (e.g., willingness to pay) or indirect methods (based on observed behavior).
3. Adult education, youth activities, child-rearing guidance for mothers of sponsored kindergarten children, neighborhood clubhouses and special summer vacation activities.

improvement of community services. A 'pseudo' Lorenz curve⁴ measuring the degree of equality in benefit distribution was derived for each program. The horizontal axis of this curve designates the cumulative percentage of households, ordered by income (from lowest to highest); the vertical axis measures the cumulative distribution of program beneficiaries by the respective income group.




Figure 1: Three possible distributions of benefits, by income group

Figure 1 depicts three possible re-distribution schemes, in which curve A represents a 'neutral' re-distribution (that is, the distribution of benefits follows the distribution of income); curve B represents a distribution of benefits favoring lower socio-economic

4. In the sense that, unlike a regular Lorenz curve, the 45-degree line in this analysis may be crossed by the curve.

groups; and curve C represents a 'regressive' distribution of the Project's benefits.

Findings indicate that in two areas—building and grounds improvements, and financial aid to families—benefits were more or less equally divided among income groups, implying a 'progressive' re-distribution. For the rest of the programs, the distribution of benefits was found to further inequality. This result was fairly predictable in the case of apartment expansions, as participation presupposed an ability to pay the resident's share of the cost. In the case of social programs relating to improvements in educational standards and community services, it seems that those who were also economically better off to begin with benefited more.

This analysis indicates that a certain degree of inequality was latent in the distribution of Project benefits, whether because of lack of awareness, lack of information, lack of motivation, or some other reason that prevented the weaker income groups from taking greater advantage of Project programs. Obviously, more effort should have been invested in certain instances to develop awareness and motivation among the residents regarding the various program offerings. But it could be inferred that these results may have been consistent with a policy that attempted to motivate strong families to remain in the neighborhoods.

Implicit Income Subsidy in Project Outlays

A second, and related, way of looking at the re-distribution of Project benefits was to calculate the rate of monetized Project benefits in relation to household income. Ideally, one would wish to evaluate the expression:

$$\text{Benefit Ratio} = \frac{\text{Monetary Value of Benefit of a given program}}{\text{Household Income}}$$

and compare the result among income groups. The benefit ratio is supposed to reflect the implicit value of a program's service-in-kind, which amounts to an equivalent increase in real income.

Since the data were lacking to support such an analysis, actual program outlays were used as surrogates for monetized benefits. Therefore, this ratio is referred to as an 'implicit subsidy rate' instead of a benefit ratio. Both an 'effective' rate, S , and a 'hypothetical' rate, S^* , were computed for each program; the computation of the latter assumes that the benefits are evenly divided among all households. These ratios were given as follows:

$$\text{Effective rate:} \quad S = B/(m I)$$

$$\text{Hypothetical rate:} \quad S^* = B/(M I)$$

where: B_{ji} = actual outlay for program j in neighborhood i ;
 m = total beneficiary households in neighborhood i (according to survey responses);
 M = number of households in neighborhood i ;
 I = median annual income per household in neighborhood i .

Table 1 shows the values of these ratios for four program areas: housing—improvements to one's own building and yard; improvement of neighborhood physical infrastructure; education programs and community services (covering outlays for youth and sports, community services, employment and the elderly).

Table 1: Effective and Hypothetical Subsidy: Rates in Selected Neighborhoods.

Neighborhood Location	Program Area							
	Improvements in Building and Surrounding Grounds		Physical Improvement of Neighborhood		Improvement of Educational Services		Improvement of Community Services	
	Effective	Hypothetical	Effective	Hypothetical	Effective	Hypothetical	Effective	Hypothetical
Safed (N. Israel)	27	6	12	4	30	5	25	4
Acre	13	1	41	4	19	1	9	1
Haifa	9	1	18	3	4	1	4	1
Hadera	113	9	3	1	8	2	8	3
Tel Aviv	99	14	34	10	16	4	8	3
Tel Aviv	28	16	0.5	0.3	17	3	15	5
Jerusalem	14	9	4	2	6	1	3	2

In the social program areas, the effective subsidy rate is relatively low, generally ranging from 5% to 15%. There is a greater variability in the implicit subsidy rates in the physical improvements area, which may reflect a policy that intentionally focused on physical renewal in selected neighborhoods. There is also wide variability with regard to the physical improvement of the neighborhood's appearance. Since the relevant survey question did not refer to improvements of the interviewee's own residence, but of the surrounding neighborhood, we are probably dealing here with a public good externality; and the responses should have been expected

to be more subjective than in the former area of physical improvements.

As a final comment, it should be obvious that the economic findings should not be interpreted without proper consideration of specific situations and circumstances, as shown elsewhere in this evaluation scheme. Clearly, questions raised by the results of the economic analysis cannot be evaluated in isolation from an overall examination of Project Renewal. Such a comprehensive evaluation may reveal that certain neighborhood-specific social or economic characteristics explain, or even justify, a lack of economic efficiency or a 'regressive' re-distribution of benefits. The task of the economist is then to indicate the economic 'shadow price' of such outcomes.

Evaluation of Goal Achievement

There was no formal statement of Project Renewal goals. Through a long process that included many meetings with decision-makers and with neighborhood residents, the researchers composed a set of Project goals to be evaluated. Two main goals and several sub-goals were delineated as follows:

1. To reduce social disparities between the haves and have-nots in Israeli society:
 - to improve physical living conditions in the neighborhoods;
 - to improve social living conditions in the neighborhoods;
 - to promote the social mobility of individuals residing in the neighborhoods;
 - to provide the residents with opportunities for more control over their lives.
2. To improve the image of the selected neighborhoods and to prevent their future deterioration.

A detailed description of what happened in relation to each of the sub-goals has been presented elsewhere (Carmon, 1985, 1988; Churchman, 1986). The discussion here is limited to an analysis of the level of achievement of the two main goals.

Disparities between socio-economic groups in a society are usually measured in terms of monetary and money-equivalent resources, power resources, and prestige rewards. With the exception of a very few cases, Project Renewal barely had an impact on household income from work, because it operated almost no employment programs. Neither did it affect the level of direct transfer payments (such as children's benefits and old-age pensions), which represent an important part of family income in the

neighborhoods. The Project, on the other hand, probably did lead to greater expenses in many households, certainly for those that took out loans for housing improvement, but also for those that increased their consumption of paid-in social services. When, however, one considers not only money but also family property and the services it uses, both material goods and human capital, the conclusion is that the total resources held by many of the families increased as a result of Project Renewal activities. During its first five years of operation, the Project added on average roughly \$700 worth of services annually per household in the selected neighborhoods. Over 50% of the households benefited from some Project-aided improvement in their housing conditions; 40% of high school age children, 90% of elementary school age, 75% of kindergarten age, and 25% of the toddlers participated in at least one (usually more) of the Project's educational programs. Some 20% of the adult population took part in cultural and social activities subsidized by the Project, as did 35% of the elderly population; smaller groups benefited from employment, health, and welfare Project-added services (Alterman and Frenkel, 1985).

Analysis of the distribution of benefits among the various socio-economic groups in the neighborhoods shows that both the 'stronger' and the 'weaker' groups benefited. Improvements in formal education in the elementary schools, to which a prominent part of the budget was devoted, reached 90% of the children of the neighborhoods, and these children came from all groups. Exterior renovations were carried out mainly in buildings inhabited by renters, generally the 'weaker' among the residents; loans for housing expansions were given primarily (though by no means exclusively) to 'stronger' households with relatively greater resources. Additions to cultural and community services were also utilized more by the latter group than by the former; but special programs in these areas were provided for 'weaker' residents, such as the elderly.

The Project also had an impact, albeit weaker, on the distribution of power resources. The power (i.e., the ability to influence others) of a few residents in each neighborhood increased considerably as a result of their participation in the decisionmaking bodies of the Project—the steering committees and their sub-committees. Moreover, a sense of power was obtained, as indicated by the responses of 24% of the Household Survey interviewees who reported that they felt they had the opportunity to influence Project activities in their neighborhoods.

Social disparities, as mentioned earlier, are also measured by the amount of prestige resources held by people of various groups. Very little change, if any, occurred in this respect through the Project Renewal operation. Material resources added by Project

revenues were distributed among most of the population in the neighborhoods, and power resources were also widely distributed. Thus, a large portion of the target population advanced, and this group mobility reduced the impression of personal advancement as well as the rewards of prestige generally enjoyed by individuals as they advance.

The finding that a project that is directed to the population of a neighborhood as a whole contributed more to group mobility than to individual mobility is not surprising. At the same time, it is no wonder that individuals whose situation had improved materially, and perhaps also in terms of power, were disappointed that they were not rewarded with more prestige. It may be that they were deprived of this benefit because they responded to the aim of the Project and continued living in their old neighborhoods.

The second main goal of Project Renewal was related less to people and more to places; i.e., to the neighborhoods as functioning urban areas. Several indicators were used to measure changes in the status of the neighborhoods. The overall migration balance was found to be stable, and the characteristics of the in-migrants in the project period resembled those of the 'stronger' segments of the existing population. Apartment prices in the neighborhoods studied rose considerably, as did prices throughout the country, but remained relatively stable compared to similar dwellings in 'better' neighborhoods in the same city. Compared to distressed areas not included in Project Renewal, apartment prices in the Project's neighborhoods were found to be higher.

Subjective indicators also pointed in the same direction; i.e., that the Project had at least some positive impact. With the use of multiple regression to analyze the findings of a household survey, it was found that being beneficiaries of Project Renewal and having a positive attitude toward the Project's contribution to the neighborhood were significant in explaining the variance in rates of residents who expressed satisfaction with their neighborhoods and an intention to continue residing there in the foreseeable future. The residents' perceived image of most of the neighborhoods studied changed for the better during the Project period, and this—usually slight—improvement was credited to the Project. The image of these neighborhoods, however, did not change in the eyes of other city residents, except for some groups who lived in non-Project places but whose socio-economic status was similar to that of the residents of Project neighborhoods.

Hence, the project did not effect a revolutionary change in the status of its neighborhoods. Actually, there was no reason to expect such change from a program that observed the principles of working with current low-status populations and avoiding relocation

and gentrification. A more realistic goal is the prevention of deterioration and the achievement of stability at an acceptable level, one in which a limited gap exists between the neighborhood and its environs. A neighborhood at such a level is attractive enough to serve as a heterogeneous residential area, not only for the lowest-status group but also for working people with stable families. In order to establish relative stability of status, and assuming that the standard of living in the rest of the society is steadily rising, one must strive for a constant process of improvement in the neighborhoods. The findings of the evaluation study point to the desired direction: it seems that the Project had some success in advancing its goals and in establishing a process of modest improvements that may be expected to prevent future deterioration.

A Final Note

The integrated-evaluation methodology employed in this study enabled the simultaneous administration of various types of evaluations, all of which are important to decision-makers and each of which usually requires a separate study. The analysis shows that although its goals were not fully achieved, Project Renewal may be considered a relative success. In contrast to the prevailing 'nothing works' approach to large anti-poverty programs, our conclusion is that where specific planning and implementation guidelines are observed, government-initiated programs can bring about planned improvements in the condition of disadvantaged people and distressed places.

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